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SELECTED QUESTIONS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Of the hundreds of questions which are being discussed today in
relation to revision of state and national constitutions, three have
been selected for extensive treatment. An exhaustive analysis of the
development and relation of labor and labor law to the Nebraska
Constitution is provided by John Gradwohl, associate professor of
law, University of Nebraska. Richard Hansen, assistant law librarian
at the College of Law and a member of the Nebraska Bar, examines
the problems of federal and state executive disability and the related
problems of succession and separation of powers. State taxation is
the subject of the article by Fremont attorney Forrest Johnson who
is presently serving as state tax commissioner.
The Editors

Labor-Management Relations and
Nebraska Constitutional Revision
John M. Gradwohl*
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of labor-management relations in Nebraska is saturated with constitutional limitations. At stake are rights protected
by both the United States and Nebraska Constitutions: freedom of
speech;' the right peacefully to assemble; 2 protection against impairment of the obligation of contract 3 and a deprivation of liberty

*

B.S., 1951, LL.B., 1953, University of Nebraska; LL.M., 1957, Harvard Uni-

versity; Member, Nebraska State Bar Association; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Nebraska.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5. This has been applied
judicially almost exclusively in peaceful picketing cases.
2

U.S. CONST. amend. I; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 19. Cf. Railway Employees'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), reversing 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526

(1955).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 16. Although once signifi-

cant in limiting labor-management relations legislation, the effect of these
provisions at the present time is negligible. See Lincoln Federal Labor
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or property without due process of law; 4 and the requirement of
equal protection of the laws. 5 Arguably, certain regulation of this
area could constitute the taking of private property for public use
just compensation 6 or an imposition of involuntary serviwithout
7
tude.
The sphere of labor-management relations activity which the
State of Nebraska can regulate is limited by the federal Supremacy
Clause8 to those aspects not preempted by federal legislation. Under
existing federal legislation, this means that Nebraska can, in
general, like other states: (1) Regulate labor-management relations
subject only to the constitutional limitations as to businesses (a)
not affecting interstate commerce, 9 or (b) which affect interstate
commerce but which do not meet the jurisdictional requirements
of the National Labor Relations Board, over which Congress has
ceded jurisdiction to the states;'( (2) Grant injunctions" or award
damages 12 for violent labor activity in connection with labor
disputes in businesses covered by federal law-on the theory that,
13
apparently as a matter of constitutional federal division of powers,'

Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), affirming
149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d 477 (1948).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 and 25, and art.
III, § 18. The Nebraska Constitution forbids an irrevocable grant of special
privileges or immunities. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 16.
6 U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 2. The rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness are inherent and inalienable. NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 1. The enforcement of criminal sanctions must be in
accordance with constitutional procedure. See NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 10,
11. For additional Nebraska limitations, see notes 15, and 22-24 infra.
8For a comprehensive analysis, see Michelman, State Power to Govern
Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1961).
9See National Labor Relations Act §§ 2(6), 2(7), 9(c) (1), 10(a), 49 Stat.
450, 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6), 152(7), 159(c) (1),
160 (1958).
10National Labor Relations Act § 14(c), added by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29
U.S.C" § 164(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
"E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Empl't Rel. Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
12 E.g., Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
13 See San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959): "State
jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state
interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic
peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional

direction."

.650
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a state has inherent power to act to protect the health and safety
of its citizens-and (3) Act in accordance with and to the extent
permitted by federal law in certain areas specifically left to the
states under federal legislation, such as authorization to prohibit
union shop contracts' 4-which Nebraska has done by constitutional
provision' 5 -enforcement of certain criminal laws, 16 and determina17
tion of suits by employees against labor unions under state law.
This leaves a substantial area in which the State of Nebraska
can act. But Nebraska, like most states, has no labor-management
relations law, and very little statutory labor law on its books.' 8 A
recent Legislative Council study committee has recommended that
Nebraska enact a labor-management relations law. 19 The legislature has had comprehensive labor-management relations bills before
it at the last two sessions, 20 and has also given consideration to a
number of other bills affecting labor-management relations.

14 National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), added by 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29

U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).

15NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 13-15; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-217 to -219
(Reissue 1960). See Swindler, The Right to Work, A Decade of Development, 36 NEB. L. REV. 267 (1957). Note that these provisions relate solely
to discrimination in hiring and firing practices on the basis of union or
nonunion affiliation. The federal law, if applicable, also protects against
such discrimination in any term or condition of employment or the encouraging or discouraging of membership in any labor organization, but
permits union or maintenance of membership shops in certain instances.
16 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 604, 73 Stat. 540
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 524 (Supp. I, 1959).
17Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act § 603(a), 73 Stat. 540
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. I, 1959).
Is See Katz, Two Decades of State Labor Legislation 1937-1957, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 109 (1957). See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-812, -814 (Reissue
1956) (coercive picketing statute; probably unconstitutional in part, see
note 160 infra); §§ 28-814.01 and .02 (Reissue 1956) (mass picketing);
§§ 28-814.04 and .05 (Reissue 1956) (intimidating a striker); §§ 48-801 to
-823 (Reissue 1960) (compulsory arbitration of public utility labor disputes); §§ 48-901 to -912 (Reissue 1960) (secondary boycotts and hot
cargo); § 48-214 (Reissue 1960) (prohibits racial discrimination in collective bargaining); §§ 28-580, 28-804, 28-816, and -817 (Reissue 1956)

(anti-violence statutes); 28-725 (Reissue 1956) (imported strikebreakers); § 28-548 (Reissue 1956) (embezzlement of union funds); § 59-801

.(Reissue 1960) (antitrust statute; see State v. Employers of Labor, 102
Neb. 768, 169 N.W. 185 (1918), noted 22 NEB. L. REV. 30 (1943)); §
14-1825 (Reissue 1954) (authority of metropolitan transit authority);

§ 25-313 (3) (Reissue 1956) (union suits as entity); note 15 supra (employ-

ment discrimination on basis of union or nonunion membership).
Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 102, p. 36 (1960).
20 L.B. 670, 72d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1961); L.B. 708, 69th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1959).
19
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Congress has ceded jurisdiction to the states over a group of
comparatively local businesses affecting interstate commerce. If
the states fail to act to provide some sort of a labor-management
relations system, there is an indication that the federal government
21
may again preempt this area. States which have failed to act
would not be in a very strong position to object to the federal
occupation of the field. Regardless of the substance of its provisions, an inclusive labor law for Nebraska would give a needed
certainty and predictability to labor-management relations in the
State upon which responsible businessmen and responsible labor
leaders might rely and from which management, labor and the
public would benefit.
Under the present Nebraska Constitution, the development of
effective labor-management relations legislation may face a difficult
road. These restrictions in the present Constitution illustrate the
need for some constitutional revision, whether it be by specific
amendment or through a constitutional convention. The purpose
here is to analyze two major areas in which it is felt that the
present Nebraska Constitution severely limits the State's ability
to deal effectively with labor-management relations problems.
A. Limitations on Regulation of Controversies Between Employers
and Employees. Superimposed upon rather typical state constitutional requirements, the Constitution also provides that the legislature may create an Industrial Commission ". . . for the investigation,
submission and determination of controversies between employers
statements of Senator Kennedy, 105 CONG. REC. 17902 (1959):
" . . . we must bear in mind that 35 of the States have no adequate
labor laws. . . . [I]f any effort is made to use this provision as an

21See

opportunity to limit rights which all of us believe all American working

people and employers in these State have, then it will be very easy under
this provision for the National Labor Relations Board by administrative
decision to assume much fuller jurisdiction. .... "
Objections had been raised to ceding this jurisdiction to the states in
any event. See, e.g., Statement of Senator Morse, Id. at 17879: "It would be
one thing to allow the States which have established labor relations boards
and have provided the machinery for holding elections and for punishing
unfair labor practices to exercise jurisdiction over firms engaged in interBut it is a far different thing, indeed, to give to
state commerce ....
State courts the right to assert jurisdiction where there is no labor relations law at all in the State, where there is no provision for conducting
elections and where there is no provision for preventing or punishing
unfair labor practices ... ." See also McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A
Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REV. 205, 253
(1959): "Therefore, unless more states adopt statutes which give some
minimum protections to collective agreements and provide for representation proceedings, the argument for extention of federal jurisdiction
may be persuasive."
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and employees in any business or vocation affected with a public
interest ... .-"22 At best, this constitutional provision leaves in doubt
many vital questions about what the legislature can do with respect
to labor-management relations, and, at worst, would be a serious
straitjacket on an effective resolution of those problems.
B. Limitations on Enforceability of Voluntary Arbitration Agreements. In this area, the method most suited to resolving disputes
arising under a collective labor agreement runs afoul of Nebraska
constitutional provisions which provide that any injured person
24
can secure a remedy in court 23 and with a trial by jury.
II. LIMITATIONS ON REGULATION OF CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
Article XV, Section 9, of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
Laws may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission
and determination of controversies between employers and employees in any business or vocation affected with a public interest,
and for the prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any business or vocation affecting the public welfare.
An Industrial Commission may be created for the purpose of
administering such laws, and appeals shall lie to the Supreme
Court from the final orders and judgments of such commission.
This section was proposed by the 1920 Constitutional Convention. It was only the second such provision enacted in the United
States, following the lead Kansas had taken by legislation several
months earlier.2 5 As a result of a coal strike, Kansas had placed its
mines in a state-controlled receivership. The legal theory employed was that the mine operators as a group constituted a combination in restraint of trade. 26 The State operated the mines for
some time, and ultimately the strike was broken. In the process,
a special session of the Kansas Legislature was called for the purpose of enacting a law which would make a recurrence of such a
strike impossible. The legislature acted by creating an Industrial
Court with broad powers over all wage and employment conditions
22

NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 9.
23NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
24
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6.
25For a history of the first three years of this court, see Rabinowitz, The
Kansas Industrial Court Act, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1923): "In brief, it
proved impracticable to isolate industrial conditions in Kansas from
industrial conditions in the rest of the nation."
26Statement of Governor Henry J. Allen of Kansas, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST.
CONV. 1618 (1920). See Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1557.
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and a power of compulsory arbitration with respect to transportation, food, fuel, and clothing.
After the Kansas Industrial Court had been in operation just
five weeks, during which time eleven cases had been docketed
before it, the Governor of Kansas addressed the Nebraska Constitutional Convention. He made a stirring speech vividly outlining the
advantages of an Industrial Court.27 This speech seemed to jar the
convention into taking action in this area. Thoughts of the Kansas
Industrial Court and the Governor's talk remained constantly be28
fore the convention as the debates progressed. If a constitutional
convention is calculated to be a sort of detached deliberative process to deal with long range fundamental issues, then the proposal
of Article XV, Section 9, may have been unwise. Its enactment
by the Nebraska Convention was certainly in response to current
problems of the day, 29 and it is quite possible that the provision
would not be in the Nebraska Constitution today were it not for
the fortuitous timing of the Kansas coal episode.
The Nebraska constitutional provision was also in part an
outgrowth of federal legislation enacted in response to the

27Statement of Governor Henry J. Allen, Id. at 1618-29, 1635-37.
28Statements of Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1694, 2003 (a leading proponent who

spent two or three days in Kansas discussing the Industrial Court); Mr.
Epperson, Id. at 1937 (co-chairman of the committee reporting out the
final bill); Mr. Howard, Id. at 1953 (objecting to the proposal on the
ground, " . . . I think there is too much of Governor Allen's address

injected into it."); Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 1992, 1995; Mr. Abbott, Id. at 2001.
There had also been several references to the Kansas Court on the floor
previously. Statements of Mr. Kunz, Id. at 1549, 1561; Mr. Radke, Id. at
1553; Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1557.
29
See, e.g., Statements of Mr. Kunz, Id. at 1549: "As I understand it, Kansas
is the first state in the Union to establish this court. It is in the experimental stage, and here we are attempting to write into the constitution
an iron-clad provision establishing such a court and establishing its
powers."; Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 1991: "I cannot help but feel that we are
now upon a wave or sort of reaction, that the conditions of industrial
unrest are more or less temporary." In addition to the Kansas coal strike
and threatened national railroad strike, the Boston policemen's strike, in
which then Governor Calvin Coolidge had acted and achieved fame, was
currently in the minds of members of the convention and cited as a reason
for this proposal. Cf. Statements of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1555-57; Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1564. See also Peterson, Industrial Courts, 3 NEB. L. BULL.
487 (1925). And the members may have had in mind a major Omaha
industrial dispute in 1917 involving a general strike and lockout situation
over the requirement of yellow-dog contracts. See statement of Mr.
Bigelow, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1993 (1920); State v. Employers
of Labor, 102 Neb. 768, 169 N.W, 185 (1918) (in which Mr. Bigelow had
been a counsel).
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threatened railroad strike of 1916. The Adamson Act had been
passed by Congress compelling a settlement of that dispute, and
had been held valid over constitutional attack.30 This was pointed
out by lawyers at the Constitutional Convention as a legal basis
of the power which might be exerted to settle controversies between employers and employees. 31
The section was one of the most thoroughly considered proposals
at the Constitutional Convention. Its adoption was a meritorious
accomplishment of the convention and showed considerable foresight and understanding of the basic issues involved. Yet, in present
day terms, the section, at least on its face, does not answer several
of the really vital questions involved. Fortunately, some of these
answers may be provided by a close examination of the history of
its enactment. In at least one instance, that of the basic scope of
its business coverage, the limitations appear to be unduly restrictive
today, and are likely to constitute an extremely serious obstacle to
its effective use.
A. What language in this section is applicable to labor-management
relations?An analysis of the historical development of Article XV,

Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (5-4 decision). This legislation prescribed wages, hours and working conditions for a six to nine month
period which was intended to give the interested parties sufficient time
to reach an agreement and avoid a nationwide strike. Id. at 344-46. But
the court treated this regulation as if it amounted to compulsory arbitration. Id. at 351, 359. The regulation was held valid because by engaging
themselves in a "business charged with a public interest," both the
employers and employees subjected themselves to regulation of this very
type. Id. at 352. But cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S.
522, 544 (1923) (unanimous decision invalidating the Kansas Industrial
Court statute): "It is not too much to say that the ruling in Wilson v. New
went to the border line, although it concerned an interstate carrier in
the presence of a nation-wide emergency and the possibility of great
disaster. Certainly there is nothing to justify extending the drastic regulation sustained in that exceptional case to the one before us."
31Statements of Mr. Peterson, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1943-46
(1920); Mr. Flansburg, Id. at 1949-52. This was also the basis for the
Kansas legislation. See Statement of Governor Henry J. Allen, Id. at
1622-23 (although the specific power to establish the tribunal was that of
the legislature to create inferior courts); Court of Industrial Relations v.
Wolff Packing Co., 109 Kan. 629, 644, 201 Pac. 418, 425 (1921), reversed
262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923): "If under the commerce clause of the federal
Constitution Congress can regulate the wages and hours of labor of those
working on railroads, the state under the police power should be able to
30

regulate the wages and hours of labor of those working in a packing
plant wholly within the state. The powers of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution are no greater than the authority of the
state under the police power."
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Section 9, shows clearly that the first sentence deals with two
independent subjects: (1) controversies between employers and
employees in businesses affected with a public interest, and (2)
trade regulation generally in businesses affecting the public welfare. With respect to labor-management controversies, only the
first part of the sentence is applicable. This provides that "Laws
may be enacted providing for the investigation, submission and
determination of controversies between employers and employees
in any business or vocation affected with a public interest . ... "
The remaining portion of the first sentence 2 pertains only to trade
regulation matters, or what was termed "profiteering" in the
language of the Constitutional Convention. The second sentence
of the section, concerning the Industrial Commission, relates to both
labor and trade regulation matters.
Originally, four separate proposals for an industrial court were
introduced at the convention and referred to the Committee on
Industrial Relations,33 which considered them for nearly three
months. 3 4 These proposals were all indefinitely postponed, and in
their place the committee reported out a substitute, Proposal No.
329.35 This proposal was considered on the floor of the convention,
but was ordered back to a joint committee of the Industrial Relations Committee and the Miscellaneous Subjects Committee for

32This portion would read, "Laws may be enacted providing . . . for the
prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains in any
business or vocation affecting the public welfare."
33
Proposal No. 144, 1 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 204 (1919) (creating a

constitutional industrial commission generally supervising all labor laws,
and which could be given binding power to resolve controversies and
forbid strikes or lockouts pending such decision); Proposal No. 217, Id. at

263 (1920) (permissive industrial court with authority over all labor laws,
including personal injuries, and power to determine disputes between
employers and employees and carry out its decrees by injunction or other
order); Proposal No. 220, Id. at 291 (industrial court could be given

jurisdiction in disputes when appealed to by either party, but court would
not have power to deny right to refuse employment or cease work, singly
or collectively); Proposal No. 237, Id. at 336 (legislature or people could

create industrial court with investigatory power, power to enforce better
working conditions, and power to act as mediator when requested by
either party or when the interests of the public were involved). Other

labor proposals were submitted. See, e.g., Proposal No. 80, Id. at 134
(1919) (recognition and enforcement of right of collective bargaining);
Proposal No. 93. Id. at 140 (interference with right to work would cause
loss of electoral privilege); Proposal No. 189, Id. at 242 (1920) (strict
accountability of labor organizations, agents and officers).

34See Statement of Mr. Donohoe, 1 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1558
(1920).
351d. at 1318.
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combination with the trade regulation proposal.36 The trade regulation proposal and Proposal No. 329 were both indefinitely postponed and the combination proposal which, as amended, ultimately
passed the convention, Proposal No. 333, was reported out by the
joint committee.37 From this point on in the convention's consideration of Proposal No. 333, there was a clear understanding that the
labor-management controversy and the trade regulation clauses,
separated above, operated entirely independently of each other.
B. Can the Legislature regulate labor-management relations other
than through an Industrial Commission, (1) under Article XV,
Section 9? or (2) under other legislative authority?
1. Article XV, Section 9. This provision was generally considered by the 1920 Constitutional Convention for its basic purpose
of permitting an Industrial Commission to be established. Even
though throughout its consideration, the proposal contained two
separate sections for the power to legislate with respect to employment controversies and the authorization of an industrial court, 38
there was no expressed intention that the section was designed to
constitute a grant of authority to act concerning labor or trade
regulation matters other than through an Industrial Commission.
Actually, the sense of the convention was probably to the effect
that the first part of the first sentence was merely a recognition
of a combination of existing legislative powers, but that an Industrial Commission was needed to combine in one place legislative,
judicial and administrative powers.3 9 On the other hand, there does
not appear to be any indication that the first sentence should not
operate as an independent grant of legislative authority.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has specifically cited Article XV,
Section 9, on only two occasions, both of them involving trade
regulation aspects of the section. 40 Both decisions assume tacitly
that the first sentence of the section is an independent grant of
authority to act other than through an industrial commission concerning a business which affects the public welfare. Such a
Id. at 1832-33 (by a vote of 32-26).
37M. at 1910-11, 1936.
36

38M. at 1318, 1936. The proposal contained separate sections from the time
it was originally reported out onto the floor down to the point of the
final substitute. No reason was given why the final amendment contained
only one section. Id. at 1984-86.
notes 108-16 infra.
Standard Oil v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N.W. 172 (1926), aff'd

39
See
40

275 U.S. 504 (1927); State ex tel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n v.

Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293 N.W. 393 (1940),
nom. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).

rev'd on other grounds sub
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construction seems perfectly proper under the section. But it
still imposes a serious limitation on effective legislative action.
It seems clear that under this section the legislature can take
action only with respect to businesses or vocations which, as to
the type41of economic activity carried on, are affected with a public
interest.
2. Other Legislative Authority. There is no indication that by
the enactment of Article XV, Section 9, the Constitutional Convention meant to foreclose legislative action under the police power
generally. The reply to objections that the section merely permitted
what could be done under the police power anyway took the form
of explaining other advantages flowing from the section rather
than discussing police power. 42 And, of course, there has been a
large number of Supreme Court decisions since 1920 considering
legislative power over trade regulation which have been handled
in terms of the general police power rather than Article XV, Section 9. But if the general police power of the state is used as legislative authority, the effectiveness of the labor-management relations
legislative action may be seriously reduced. Lost will be the ability
to combine in a single body the various legislative, judicial and
executive functions which was considered so vital by the framers
of Article XV, Section 9, 43 and which still seems to be most desirable in effectively resolving matters of this type.
The recent proposals for a labor-management relations act have
called for representation matters to be handled by a special commissioner appointed by the governor 44 or by the commissioner of
labor. 45 Under both bills, unfair labor practices would be remedied
by direct suit under the statute in the district courts. There has
been no attempt to utilize Article XV, Section 9, either as general
authority under the first sentence, or to create an Industrial Court
to handle the controversies.
To the extent that general supervision of a labor-management
relations act is left to the courts, 46 the administrative machinery
41

42

See notes 47-49 infra.
See notes 112 and 115 infra.

43 See notes 108-110, 115-116 infra. But cf. L.B. 670, 72d Neb. Leg. Sess.
§§ 7(4) (d), 7(7) (1961).
44 L.B. 708, 69th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1959).
45L.B. 670, 72d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1961).
46See Neb. Leg. Council Rep. No. 102, at 28, 36 (1960): "Management did

testify that if a labor relations statute was passed it should be administered by the courts and not by a special commission or board." The
committee recommended that the act be administered by the Commissioner of Labor and by the courts.
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necessary to supervise representation elections would seem to be
absent, and executive, and possibly legislative, powers would be
likewise lacking in the case of unfair labor practices. The history
of the development of an effective labor-management relations
law on the federal level was primarily one of getting the solution
of these matters out of the courts and into a specialized governmental body. To a considerable degree, this philosophy underlies
the Industrial Court provisions of Article XV, Section 9.
C. Can the Legislature act with respect to controversies between
employers and employees in enterprises other than "... . any business
or vocation affected with a public interest," (1) under Article XV,
Section 9? or (2) under other legislative authority?
1. Article XV, Section 9. The phrase "any business or vocation
affected with a public interest" was extensively considered at the
Constitutional Convention. From the history of the phrase, it seems
clear that legislative action cannot be taken under this section
except where the business or vocation regulated is affected with a
public interest.
The history of this provision is unusually clear and unanimous
in this regard. The committee report at the time the final bill was
reported out contains a notation of this limitation on the legislative
authority. 47 A statement on the floor of the convention by one of
the co-chairmen of the joint committee stressed this factor. 4 There
were repeated references throughout the floor consideration of the
proposal to the interpretation that the legislature could not act
except where a business was affected with a public interest. 49 There
was also considerable debate over just what area this left the
legislature free to turn over to an industrial commission.

47

Report of Joint Committee of the Committees on Miscellaneous Subjects
and Industrial Conditions, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1910 (1920):

"We do not approve of the grant of unlimited power to regulate legitimate
business and vocations, by license or otherwise. . . . We consider the
exercise of this power necessary or proper only in the interest of the
public welfare."
48 Statement of Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1937: "The Committees on consideration
of this matter concluded, Mr. Chairman, that no attempt to regulate any
business concern was justifiable unless the business engaged in by the

concern was in some manner a business in which the public welfare was
concerned. Therefore, we undertook to frame this proposal, to provide no
regulation whatever for any business, unless it was a business in which
the public welfare was concerned or interested."
49Statements of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1939: "In other words, the Committee's
idea was to allow the development of industry of legitimate business pur-

posely free, without regulation or interference, until and unless by continuation, or otherwise, it reached a point where the public interest was
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In the later stages of its consideration, an amendment was made
changing "public welfare" to "public interest," thought to be a narrower term, for an express purpose of limiting the scope of the legislative authorization." Also, at a point close to final passage, the
trade regulation provision, which by inadvertence read merely "prevention of unfair business practices and unconscionable gains affecting the public welfare,"'" was amended without controversy by
adding after "gains" the words "in any business or vocation. '52 It is
also interesting that some years later, after the Kansas Industrial
Court Act had been held unconstitutional, 53 one of the principal proponents of the Nebraska proposal wrote that the validity of the
Nebraska provision was not in jeopardy by that decision since the
Nebraska Legislature could by the very language of the Nebraska
to "any business or vocation afConstitution act only with regard
54
fected with a public interest."
Both the plain meaning of Article XV, Section 9, and the contemporaneous history of its enactment impose as a limitation on
legislative action under the section a condition that the legislature
can act only with respect to business or vocations affected with a
public interest.
2. Other legislative authority. It seems likely that the general
police power of the legislature to act with respect to labor-manage-

so affected that it might be in danger."; Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1961, 1964, 1969:
" . . . where it is purely private, to leave that to settlement by private
negotiation."; Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 1993 (opponent of the proposal): "By
the rule of exclusion that would mean that those businesses or vocations
which are not affected with the public interest are not to be within the
scope of the powers of this tribunal. I understand you to mean, in the
phrasing of this proposal that you are not willing to endow any court
with the right to determine controversies other than those affected with
the public interest. . . ." See Statement of Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1973. Some
members objected to this limitation, however. See Statements of Mr.
Magney and Mr. Kunz, Id. at 2000.
50 See notes 78 and 79 infra.
512 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 2453 (1920).
52 Id. at 2453-54.
53Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (compulsory
arbitration of wages).

See Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267

U.S. 552 (1925) (compulsory arbitration of hours); Dorchy v. Kansas,
264 U.S. 286 (1924) (compulsory arbitration of working conditions in
coal mines).
54 Peterson, Industrial Courts, 3 NEB. L. BULL. 487, 498-99 (1925). But the
author had suggested to the Constitutional Convention that packers might
be within the proposal. Statement of Mr. Peterson, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST.
CONV. 1974 (1920).
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ment relations is not limited to businesses affected with a public
interest.
a. Federal limitations. At one time, there was a federal limitation under the Due Process Clause that the business regulated be
charged with a public interest. For example, when the Kansas Industrial Court case was decided by the United States Supreme
Court, the Court concerned itself with whether or not the business
of meat packing was charged with a public interest. 55 But the doctrine of "affected with a public interest" was permanently laid to
rest in the landmark case of Nebbia v. New York 5G where it was specifically rejected by the Court. And this has been restated by the
Court on later occasions, including the Nebraska closed shop
amendment decision. 57 It is safe to assume that there is today no
federal requirement that states regulate only businessess affected
with a public interest.
b. Nebraska limitations. The Nebraska Court has not required, as a general prerequisite to economic regulation, that the
business be affected with a public interest. Yet the Court has quoted

55Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535-39 (1923). This
decision may be read as refusing to decide whether or not the business
was affected with a public interest, but as holding that in any event,
compulsory arbitration was unconstitutional as applied to this particular
business. Id. at 539: "We are relieved from considering and deciding
definitely whether preparation of food should be put in the third class of
quasi-public businesses, noted above, because even so, the valid regulation
to which it might be subjected as such, could not include what this act
attempts." See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (ticket
scalper statute); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employment
agency fees); Willams v. Standard Oil, 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (gasoline
prices); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (ice manufacturing).
56291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934): "It is clear that there is no closed class or
category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the function of
courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to
determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged
regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn
it as arbitrary or discriminatory . . . But there can be no doubt that
upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate
a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the
products or commodities it sells."
57 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536 (1949): "The Court also ruled on a distinction between businesses
according to whether they were or were not 'clothed with a public interest.' This latter distinction was rejected in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502. That the due process clause does not ban legislative power to fix
prices, wages and hours as was assumed in the Wolff case, was settled
as to price fixing in the Nebbia and Olsen cases. That wages and hours
"
can be fixed by law is no longer doubted ....
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with approval 58 the following language used by the United States
Supreme Court in invalidating the Kansas Industrial Court Act: 5 9
It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution,
that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor, the wood
chopper, the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such a
public interest that the price of his product or his wages could be
fixed by state regulation ....

One does not devote one's property or

business to the public use or clothe it with a public interest merely
because one makes commodities for, and sells to, the public in the
common callings of which those above mentioned are instances.

In these cases, the Court had before it the question of the validity of the Nebraska law licensing and regulating employment agencies and fixing the amount of the fees which the agencies could
charge. 60 In the first opinion, 61 the court invalidated the law under
a United States Supreme Court decision 62 which contained language
that an employment agency is not a business affected with a public
interest. The Nebraska Court reasoned that this decision had not
been overruled by the Nebbia case and other United States Supreme Court decisions upholding state minimum wage legislation.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the judgment was
its earlier decision
reversed, and the Court effectively overruled
63
upon which the Nebraska Court had relied.
Subsequently, in a new action, the Nebraska Court held that

58 Boomer v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 586, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1943);

State
ex tel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 578,
293 N.W. 393, 395 (1940). The opinion was also cited with approval on
another phase of the public interest issue in Standard Oil Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 250-51, 207 N.W. 172, 175 (1926).
59 Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 537 (1923).
60This provision is now NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-509 (Reissue 1960). Although it has never been amended by specific legislative action, the
Revisor of Statues was authorized to act by himself to delete any statutory
language held unconstitutional between the time of his original report
and the publication of the Revised Statutes of 1943. Neb. Laws c. 115, § 4,
p. 402 (1943). It was apparently under this authority that the fee language
was deleted from the present statutes. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-508
(Cum. Supp. 1929). Apparently, too, this would now preclude the Court
from holding that employment agencies have become affected with a
public interest in the intervening years or from ruling on the issue
whether the material remaining in the statute was severable from that
deleted.
61 State ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 574, 293
N.W. 393 (1940).
62 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
63 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941): "The drift away from Ribnik
v. McBride, supra, has been so great that it can no longer be deemed a
controlling authority."
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private employment agencies were still not ". . . a business in which
the public has such an interest that price fixing may be included as
a method of regulation under the provisions of our Constitution."6 4
The provision fixing maximum fees was held to be unreasonable,
prohibitory, and confiscatory under four separate sections of the
Nebraska Constitution, but, conspicuously, the Due Process Clause
was not relied upon.
The Court, however, has upheld an unfair price discrimination
act without mentioning that this act undoubtedly applies to some
businesses which are not affected with a public interest. 65 Similarly, an unfair trade act, although invalidated on other grounds,
was not struck down summarily on the basis that some businesses
involved would not be affected with a public interest. 66 Yet, in a
more recent decision, the Court, although it nullified a law regulating auctioneering on other grounds, specifically stated that the
business of an auctioneer was affected with a public interest and
therefore subject to reasonable legislative restriction.6 7 And the
Court has also felt it necessary to state that labor unions, them68
selves, are affected with a public interest.
Whether the business of the butcher, the baker, the tailor,
the wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner, is subject to
labor-management relations regulation 69 by Nebraska under the Ne-

64 Boomer

v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 586-87, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511-12 (1943):
"While it is true that the supreme court of the United States has receded
from its position in the later cases in interpreting the provisions of the
federal Constitution, this court has consistently adhered to the doctrine,

except in a business in which the owner by devoting it to a public use,
in effect, grants the public an interest in the use and subjects himself to
public regulation to the extent of that interest. ....
".
65 Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949).

This argument was at

least indirectly suggested to the Court. See Brief of Appellant, p. 6, Hill
v. Kusy, supra.

McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68
N.W.2d 608 (1955).
67
Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 584, 76 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1956). See Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876).
68 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb.
507, 527, 31 N.W.2d 477, 489 (1948).
69 See notes 55 and 64 supra. These holdings may be distinguished as indicating only that the vocations are free from compulsory arbitration, wage
66See

or price regulation, or similar limitations. See Nebbia v. New York, 291

U.S. 502, 536-37 n. 39 (1934).

Even though presumably not subject to

wage and hour regulation under these holdings, the businesses were still
subject to some regulation, such as criminal penalties for an unlawful
strike or lockout extortionate in nature. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306
(1926).
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braska Constitution is not free from doubt. The reliance upon an
"affected with a public interest" test has certainly never been
abandoned by the Court. Its language appears in the most recent decisions in this general area.
One can only speculate that the earlier cases may have had in
mind that being affected with a public interest determined whether
or not the business was subject or not subject to any economic
regulation. 70 The more recent cases would seem, comparatively, to
indicate a present attitude on the part of the Court to use the affected with a public interest concept in measuring substantively the
reasonableness of the means chosen to effectuate the legislative
end. 71 There also seems to have been a shift in emphasis from inquiry into the type of business activity conducted by the enterprise
the general public interest in the
involved to inquiry concerning
72
type of legislation enacted.
Even though the federal decisions have specifically discarded
the "affected with a public interest" test, the Court will still determine whether the statute involved bears a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose.73 But there might be a significant dif70

See, e.g., Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939): "Whether

an occupation is charged with such a public interest as to warrant its

regulation is a legislative question with which the courts ordinarily will
not interfere."
71
See, e.g., Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 586-87, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511-12
(1943): "But even if the evidence showed that plantiffs had engaged in
unfair business practices and in the making of unconscionable profits,
proper regulatory statutes afford a complete remedy without a resort to
price fixing ....

We think, therefore, that the legislature may properly

prescribe standards, reasonable in their nature, by which a private employment agency may operate, and secure their enforcement by recourse
to the courts and by granting licenses upon receipt of a reasonable license
fee to those who comply with all the valid regulations of the act. ...
We also hold that a private employment agency is not a business in which
the public has such an interest that price fixing may properly be included
as a method of regulation under the provisions of our Constitution."
Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 584-85, 76 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1956): "The
source of the authority to regulate auctions is the police power and a
regulatory statute adopted by virtue of the police power must have
relation to the public health, safety, and welfare. . . . Liberty is not absolute. It implies absence of arbitrary restraint but not immunity from
reasonable regulations."
72
See, e.g., McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703,
718, 68 N.W.2d 608, 617 (1955): "This court has said that in the absence
of appearance of public interest the Legislature may not itself impose
prices ....

"

Cf. Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 584-87, 76 N.W.2d 738,

used).
745-46 (1956) (where both approaches appear to have been
73
See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-38 (1934); Virginian Ry.
v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 553-54, 558 (1937); Olsen v. Nebraska,
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ference in degree between the wide latitude given to a legislative
determination of reasonable means under the federal decisions and
that which would be permitted by the Nebraska Court under the
Nebraska Constitution.
D. What is meant by ". . . any business or vocation affected with a
public interest?" As the joint committee reported the proposal out
to the floor of the convention, the labor-management relations
clause covered ". . . controversies between employers and employees
in which the public welfare is affected," and the trade regulation
clause was limited to "any business or vocation affected with a public interest. '74 An amendment was offered under which each clause
would have read "affected with a public interest. '75 After debate,
objection was raised that the trade regulation section should not be
so limited, but should relate to "affecting the public welfare." 76
Finally, the labor-management relations clause was limited to "any
business or vocation affected with a public interest," and the trade
regulation clause amended to cover "any business or vocation affecting the public welfare. ' 77 This switch in terminology was deliberately made after thorough and careful thought.
From this consideration by the convention, some general conclusions may be drawn. "Affected with a public interest" is a narrower phrase than "affecting the public welfare,"7 8 and was used in
313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941): "We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on

that score suggest a choice which 'should be left where . . . it was left
by the Constitution-to the States and to Congress.'
742 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1936 (1920). The earlier version of the
labor-management proposal also referred to controversies ". . . in which
the public welfare is affected." See Proposal No. 329, Id. at 1318. But the
difference in wording was apparently not intentional. See Statements of
Mr. Bigelow and Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1971-72: "Mr. Bigelow: .

.

. Why

the difference in the form of phraseology? Mr. Epperson: In answer to
that question, Mr. Chairman, I would say it was not the intention, as I
understand the subcommittee, to make any difference; it was perhaps
inadvertent in using the different phraseology. There was no intention
on the part of the Committee to make any difference in the powers of the
Commission of the two subjects it proposed to handle." Cf. Mr. Ferneau,
Id. at 1978-79.
75Proposal of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1959-60. The phrase "business or vocation

affected with a public interest" had been proposed in an earlier suggested

amendment but was not discussed then. See Proposal of Mr. Peterson,
Id. at 1695.
76Statement of Mr. Rankin, Id. at 1984.
77
Amendment of Mr. Heasty, Id. at 1984.
by that phrase 'business
78Statements of Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1959: "...
affected with the public interest' you will have eliminated the former
question and you will have eliminated the large scope of human endeavor,
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79
the labor-management relations provisions for that reason. "Afand expanding term
fected with a public interest" is a changing
80
as public interests and demands change.
Concerning the critical question of how a business affected
with a public interest can be distinguished from one not affected
with a public interest, the constitutional debates were woefully inconclusive. The problem was not with the lack of a definition,
but with the fact that there were many attempts to define the
phrase, each speaker having his own version.
From the debates, it would appear that the determination of
whether or not a business or vocation is affected with a public interest under this section was intended to be made almost exclusively
on the basis of the product involved and of the public interest in that
product. Much of the debates concerned whether specific businesses
were affected with a public interest or with the public welfare,

and confined the regulations to a specific field." Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960;
Mr. Rankin, Id. at 1984; Mr. Heasty, Id. at 1985: "It must be plain to
every member of the Convention that the public welfare means something more than business affected with the public interests .. "
79
Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960, 1964 (proposer of the original
amendment): "It was my thought that the term 'public welfare' was too
comprehensive, and perhaps not susceptible of sufficient definition." Mr.
Peterson, Id. at 1959; and Mr. Heasty, Id. at 1985 (proposer of the final
amendment): "There is, in my view, a broad distinction between those
two expressions, and I have therefore sought to observe that distinction
in the preparation of this substitute." Similarly, the phrase "affecting the
public welfare" was used in the trade regulation provision because it was
broader.

Statement of Mr. Rankin, Id. at 1984: ".

.

. substituting this

language 'affecting the public welfare' so broadening the scope in there
with what has been the trade commission idea and still leaving it limited
in the other part of the proposal."
80 See, e.g., Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1962: "It is an elastic rule of
law under which various activities have, from time to time, broadened to
meet the changed condition of society."; Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1974: "That
field is a growing one of necessity as new industrial conditions arise and
that field must, of necessity, expand." Also see Peterson, Industrial
Courts, 3 NEB L. BULL. 487, 494 (1925): "This phrase was selected by
the Constitutional Convention because it has been judicially defined
through several centuries, but, while judicially defined, differs from an
attempt at enumeration in that it permits an extension of the field
under changing conditions." This was stated to be a basis for objection
to the bill by the opponents. Statement of Mr. Bigelow, 2 PROC. NEB.
CONST. CONV. 1995 (1920): "It is conceded, therefore, that the definition
of what businesses are affected with the public interests are matters of
consideration by the courts, and the courts are changeable on the proposition and they are constantly widening the scope. They are constantly
revising that definition to what they conceive to be new problems and
new conditions. .. ."
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or were within the phrase, "the production and distribution of commodities essential to the public welfare," which was included in
some of the preliminary versions of the proposal.81 There was general agreement that the so-called public utilities and enterprises
then subject to a public franchise or to control by a public regulatory body would be covered. 2 But an amendment which would
have limited the commission's jurisdiction to interruptions in public service or in the operation of public utilities or in the production
and distribution of commodities
essential to the public health and
8 3
safety was not adopted.
There also seemed to be agreement that public interest would
include that class encompassed by the early common law use of
that phrase.8 4 This would involve persons purportedly devoting
themselves or their property to public use, such as policemen and
8 5
firemen, grist mill operators, and hotel keepers and restauranteurs.
Beyond this, there was much discussion, but little agreement.
In the doubtful area were a number of businesses not originally
affected with a public interest but then considered to be affected
with a public interest because of changed circumstances. Specific businesses were mentioned in the convention debates as
potentially falling within this class, including stockyards and packing houses, 86 blacksmiths, 7 milk distributors,8 8 retail merchants

81See 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1318, 1936 (1920).
82

83

Statements of Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1564, 1973; Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960; Mr.

Heasty, Id. at 1985. Public franchise or subjection to control by a regulatory agency was apparently intended to mean regulation for economic
purposes only. There is no indication that the phrase was intended to
include the many businesses subject to licensing or regulation under the
State's general police power over matters of public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. Franchise apparently included a power of the State
to require the business to serve all persons.
Proposals of Mr. Sears, Id. at 1561, 1692.
Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1962; Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1563-64,

84See

85

1974. No objection was made to this position.
For excellent surveys of the historical and analytical development of the
doctrine, see Hamilton, Affectation With Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J.

1089 (1930); McAlister, Lord Hale and Business Affected With A Public
Interest, 43 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1930).
86
Statements of Mr. Sears, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1563 (1920) (if

the controversy became so severe as to tie up all the packing houses in

Lincoln, the state could intervene); Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1965, 1969; Mr.
Peterson, Id. at 1974; Mr. Howard, Id. at 1562. Note that although the

Kansas act providing for compulsory arbitration was held unconstitutional as applied to packing houses, the Supreme Court later (but before
the affected with a public interest concept had been discarded by the

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
generally, 9 and farmers. D0 Cited as examples falling outside of the
labor-management controversy provision were disputes between a
farmer and his hired hands,9 ' a contractor and his laborer working
93
on a house for a private individual, 92 and a doctor and his nurse.
The convention was advised that the Nebraska Supreme Court

Court) upheld the federal Packers and Stockyards Act permitting the
Secretary of Agriculture to fix a tariff of maximum charges by Commissionmen at the Omaha stockyards. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U.S. 420, 439 (1930) (distinguishing Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928)): "The question upon which this court divided in those

cases was whether the services there sought to be regulated were then
affected with a public interest. Whether a business is of that class de-

pends, not upon the amount of capital it employs, but upon the character

of the service which those who are conducting it engage to render." The

Court also distinguished other cases on the basis that, "There is here no
attempt to fix anyone's wages or to limit anyone's net income."
87See Statements of Mr. Bryant and Mr. Epperson, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST.
CONV. 1938 (1920): "Mr. Bryant: Would this include a blacksmith shop

that might affect the public welfare? Mr. Epperson: If a blacksmith
was performing work which affected the public interest it would and
should."
88
See Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1965-66; Mr. Donohoe, Id. at 1560;
Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1564-65.
8

9See Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1966-67; Mr. Alder and Mr. Heasty,
Id. at 1986 (discussing the phrase "business affecting the public welfare"):
"Mr. Alder: . . . Is that broad enough to include the retail store keeper?
Mr. Heasty: I think so."
9OSee Statements of Mr. Evans and Mr. Stewart, Id. at 1942-43; Mr. Taylor,
Id. at 1959; Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960; Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 1996: "There is
danger there and ground for the fear that some of the gentlemen expressed on the floor this morning and yesterday, that this would affect
the farmer, and it seems to me to be very well founded." Other categories
discussed included lawyers, bankers, insurance companies, producers and
distributors of polished diamonds, food and clothing, associated press dispatchers, organizations furnishing market quotations and coal mines.
91See Statements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960; Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1557: "...
not a controversy arising on my farm or in my law office, but a controversy in which the public welfare is affected"; Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1941:

"If, however, all of the farm hands in the state form a Union, and you

cannot hire any farm hands, your entire problem might then come to a
point where the public would have an interest in the Union, and so would
the individual."
92
Statements of Mr. Sears, Id. at 1562; Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960.
93
Statement of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1960. But why isn't this patently a vocation affected with a public interest? The power of the state to license
only those qualified by education and good moral character to practice
medicine has long been upheld. Gee Wo v. State, 36 Neb. 241, 54 N.W. 513
(1893). But this aspect of licensing was not apparently what the convention had in mind as a public "franchise" which branded a business or
vocation affected with a public interest. See note 82 supra.
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94
For
had never defined business affected with a public interest.
guidance, the attention of the convention was directed at the prechanged to "pubcise time the phrase "public welfare" was being
95
to the famous deprovision,
lic interest" in the labor-management
96
of storregulation
state
upheld
had
which
Illinois
v.
Munn
in
cision
age charges by public warehouses. The proposer of the final amendment to this language in Article XV, Section 9, relied upon a defini97
The convention was generally
tion in Bouvier's Law Dictionary.

94

Statement of Mr. TePoel, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1961 (1920).

This appears to have been correct. The court had recently invalidated
legislation regulating the sale of anti-hog cholera serum or virus, stating
that an individual ".

.

. has the right to adopt and follow any lawful

industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, which he may see
fit, and, as an incident to this, the right to labor or employ labor, make
contracts in respect thereto upon such terms as may be agreed upon by
the parties, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property of
all kinds. The enjoyment or deprivation of these rights and privileges
constitutes the essential difference between liberty and oppression." Hall
v. State, 100 Neb. 84, 89-90, 158 N.W. 362, 364 (1916). The court cited with
approval an Illinois case invalidating a requirement of regular payment
of wages because " . . . the employer and employee had a right to make
95

lawful contracts regarding the time of payment."
Statements of Mr. Peterson, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1974 (1920);
Mr. Ferneau, Id. at 1979.

96 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1876):

"...

it has been customary in England from

time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for
services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this
day, statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some or all of these
subjects; and we think it has never yet been successfully contended that
such legislation came within any of the constitutional prohibitions against
interference with private property ....

Looking, then, to the common

law, from whence came the right which the Constitution protects, we find
that when private property is 'affected with a public interest, it ceases to

be juris privati only.' . . . Property does become clothed with a public

interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large. When therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.
He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he
maintains the use, he must submit to the control."
97
Statement of Mr. Heasty, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1985 (1920):
" 'Business affected with a public interest: 1. Where the business is one,
the following of which is not of right but is permitted by the state as a
privilege or franchise. 2. Where the state on public grounds renders to
the business a special assistance by taxation or otherwise. 3. Where for
the accommodation of a business special use is allowed to be made of
public property or of a public easement. 4. Where the special privileges
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assured that the phrase constituted a legal definition to which at
least the United States Supreme Court could give (or had given) a
precise meaning 8
Although the convention considered that judicial decision was
the means by which the public interest concept would be given
definiteness and would be kept current with the times, no such
body of law has ever developed. There has been judicial agreement
that businesses which are in the nature of public utilities or subject
to public franchise are affected with a public interest. 99 The same is
true of those exceptional occupations which have historically always
been regarded as clothed with a public interest, such as innkeepers
and grist mills. 100 With respect to the businesses which fall into the
third category of businesses-those not affected with a public interest at their inception, but which have become affected with a
are granted in consideration of some special return to be made to the

public.'" He also read from a law dictionary quoting Cooley's work on
Constitutional Limitations, "'PUBLIC INTEREST. If by public permission one is making use of public property and he chances to be the only
one with whom the public can deal with respect to the use of that
property, his business is affected with a public interest which requires
him to deal with the public on reasonable terms.'" His own version was
stated, "In other words business that is affected by a public interest is
business for which the public as a whole, which society because of some

person or corporation and special right, privilege or franchise, and in

consideration of the granting of that right of franchise the public interest
is affected and the conduct of such corporation may be regulated by law."
9sStatements of Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1964: "The courts have said what business is affected with the public interest .... That term is susceptible of
the precise definition .... The phrase 'affected with a public interest' is
a technical phrase with a precise and technical meaning."; Mr. Peterson,
Id. at 1974 (criticising the phrase "distribution of commodities essential to
the public welfare" because the phrase gets away from accepted meaning): "The United States Supreme Court always stands as a bulwark and
it has, time and time again, drawn the line, and it will not reach into the
ordinary vocations, and should not, but if we want to stay on the safe
ground let us stay by the ancient landmarks and use the phrase that has a
well defined meaning."; Mr. Abbott, Id. at 1978-79: "If I understand it
correctly, the amendment of Mr. TePoel changes the proposal of the committee and makes it apply to business affected with a public interest.
The question of what is a public interest is well defined by the courts as
Mr. TePoel said. We are not branching out into a new field, when we use
those terms because they are well defined. . . . As I said, the courts have
defined what is a public interest. . . . [T]his is a well defined term."
99 See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923);
Boomer v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 586-87, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1943).
100 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1876); Wolff Packing Co. v.
Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). No Nebraska case has relied
upon this classification, but recognition of auctioneers might rest on this
basis. See note 67 supra.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
public interest because of changed conditions-there has been agreement neither as to the specific businesses falling into the classification nor as to the yardstick by which they would be determined.
The whole concept of business affected with a public interest
was abandoned on the federal level more than twenty-five years
ago. It never reached maturity there, and was probably abandoned
in considerable part because it was neither meaningful nor
workable.
Nebraska case law has never been required to develop a concept
of business affected with a public interest as a prerequisite for economic regulation under the state constitution. This language in
Article XV, Section 9, has never been judicially tested. We can only
speculate whether Nebraska would employ the extremely strict
view that the federal courts used in the prime of the public interest doctrine, and which was applied in the Kansas Industrial Court
case, or whether it would now adopt a more expansive application.
Perhaps the recent preoccupation of the Court with the public interest in the legislation rather than in the business involved in police
power cases indicates that a more liberal test would now be used
by the Court in construing the language of Article XV, Section 9.
Also, in the police power cases, the Court has stated that the exercise of the power must be measured by social and economic conditions existing at the time the power is exercised, rather than the
time the Constitution was approved. 01'
The Court could reason that by employing a labor force the
business becomes affected with a public interest insofar as its labor-management relations problems are concerned and would,
therefore, be subject to regulation under a state labor-management
relations act. This approach would find support in analogy to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving the Na-

101 Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 331, 289 N.W. 388, 391-92 (1939): "Liberty of
contract and the right to use one's property as one wills are fundamental

constitutional guarantees, but the degree of such guarantees must be
determined in the light of social and economic conditions existing at the
time the guaranty is proposed to be exercised, rather than at the time the
Constitution was approved, otherwise legislative power becomes static and
helpless to regulate and adjust to new conditions constantly arising. ...
The balance between due process and the police power is therefore more
or less unstable, as it must necessarily keep pace with the economic and
social orders. As the exercise of the police power increases to meet new
conditions, the protection of the due process clauses must necessarily
recede to a corresponding degree. A proper consideration of the act
requires us, therefore, to construe it in the light of the later decisions,
rather than the earlier ones which were controlled by circumstances and
conditions playing no part in the case now before us."
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tional Labor Relations Act passed under the federal interstate commerce power. 10 2 It might prevail with respect to Nebraska legislative action taken under the police powers. But Article XV, Section 9, requires as a prerequisite to legislation that the businesses
involved be affected with a public interest. Granted that on its face
this phrase does not limit the classification of business solely to those
in whose economic product the public has a substantial interest, the
public interest requirement does seem to be tied to "business or vocation" in such a way that some showing of special privilege or special concern with that enterprise is necessary to brand it as a "business or vocation affected with a public interest."
For purposes of their own regulation, labor unions have been
termed affected with a public interest and a closed shop contract
ban upheld. 0 3 But it does not follow that since unions are affected
with a public interest, the related businesses are automatically subject to regulation.
By its requirement of business or vocation affected with a public interest, Article XV, Section 9, has implanted in the Constitution
a prerequisite for legislative action which is essentially impossible to
define. The operation of the section is dependent upon an interpretation of this phrase. To this extent, Article XV, Section 9, can be
given practical meaning only by constitutional amendment, or by
the tedious and perilous process of trial and error from whatever number of judicial decisions is necessary to build a workable
definition of the phrase.
E. Who makes the determinationwhether or not a business or vocation is "affected with a public interest?" The determination of
whether a business is affected with a public interest or whether the
enactment of legislation is in the public interest is a legislative question with which the courts will not ordinarily interfere. 0 4 Yet, in
102 See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 41-43 (1937). But the NLRB has not pressed its jurisdiction to the
fullest. On a factual, rather than legal, analysis, the examples of building

maintenance employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act and individual farmers under the Agricultural Adjustment Acts might afford
closer analogies. See, e.g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

103 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb.
507, 527, 31 N.W.2d 477, 489 (1948).
' 04 See Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576,587,76 N.W.2d 738, 746 (1956); McGraw
Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 720-21, 68 N.W.2d
608, 618 (1955); Boomer v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 584, 10 N.W.2d 507, 510
(1943); Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 332, 289 N.W. 388, 392 (1939). But

in each of these cases, the Court invalidated all or part of the statutes
involved.
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proposing Article XV, Section 9, the Constitutional Convention had
in mind that the issue of whether a business was affected with a
public interest was a judicial matter to be decided by the courts. 10 5
This was especially true with respect to those businesses which
originally would not have been considered as affected with a public
interest, but which under changed circumstances would be brought
within the class. The phrase "public interest" was used rather than
"public welfare" both because of a desire to limit the range for
legislative action and because of the judicial gloss which the public interest concept had been given.
Unanswered is the question of the criteria upon which either
legislature or court is to make the determination of whether a
business or vocation is affected with a public interest. Equally unanswered is the method by which the court is to approach the subject. Apparently the Constitutional Convention had in mind that
a court would simply take judicial notice of whether or not a business was affected with a public interest. 0 6
105 Statements of Mr. TePoel, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1962 (1920):
".. . I would say that the Legislature is not and never has been the
body which has the right to say whether or not the particular business is
affected with a public interest. That is a judicial question and is determined by the court."; Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 1995: "It is stated, and I think
correctly, a legislative declaration that a certain business is affected with
a public interest, is not necessary conclusive upon the courts. The courts
may examine those declarations and if they determine it is not affected
with a public interest, they may define and narrow its application according to its conception of what the public interest is limited to." See notes
96-98 supra.
106This is what the past cases had done. But it is not clear whether or not
this issue can be raised before the Industrial Commission. Suppose a
statute says that candymaking is a business affected with a public interest over which the Industrial Commission shall have jurisdiction. Can
the Industrial Commission rule on the constitutionality of the statute on
the issue of whether candymaking is a business affected with a public
interest, or would the party have to raise the issue by suit in a district

court? The Constitutional Convention did not conceive of the Industrial
Commission as a full-fledged court, even though it was given judicial
powers. Perhaps the judicial power to determine controversies between
employers and employees would include a power of the Industrial Commission to decide its own jurisdiction, including a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute conferring such jurisdiction. But see 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 74 (1958): "A fundamental distinction
must be recognized between constitutional applicability of legislation to
particular facts and constitutionality of the legislation ....
We commit
to administrative agencies the power to determine constitutional applicability, but we do not commit to administrative agencies the power to
determine constitutionality of legislation. Only the courts have authority
to take action which runs counter to the expressed will of the legislative
body."
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Because of this history, it would not be surprising for a court to
make an independent determination of whether legislation passed
under Article XV, Section 9, relates to businesses or vocations affected with a public interest. There would still be a presumption
' But there is ample auof legislative validity under the section. 107
thority in the history of the section for a court to do more than
simply approve any legislative determination of public interest
which appears to be reasonable.
F. Does this section permit a delegation of legislative, judicial and
executive powers to the Industrial Commission, as an exception to
Article II, Section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution? Article II, Section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution provides that:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no
person or collection of persons being one of these departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others,

except as hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
One of the fundamental purposes behind Article XV, Section 9,
if not the chief reason that the specific language appears in the Constitution rather than being left to the legislature's general police
power and power to create inferior courts, was the purpose of permitting legislative, judicial and executive powers to be combined in
a single Industrial Commission. Such a combination of powers was
felt to be necessary to an effective resolution of labor-management
relations in Nebraska by the framers of the proposal. This proposition was fought for throughout a bitter floor fight on the proposal.
To the extent that it is still desirable to combine the functions of
more than one department of government in a single commission,
Article XV, Section 9, is ideally suited to the needs of labor-management relations legislation.
a
The report of the joint committee made it clear that "...
tribunal in the form of a commission with combined administrative,
legislative and judicial powers, is the proper governmental agency to
be entrusted with the powers and duties to be granted, and prescribed. . ... ,108 A co-chairman of the joint committee explained,
"We thought that it was necessary in order for this commission to
perform the duties required of it that this commission should have
administrative, judicial and legislative power, so it was the thought
of the Committee that in presenting this proposal that we should
merely make provision so that the power would be delegated and
107See State ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Kinney, 138 Neb.
574, 577, 293 N.W. 393, 395 (1940).
lO8 Report of Joint Committee of the Committees on Miscellaneous Subjects

and Industrial Conditions, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1910-11 (1920).
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then let the legislature work out the details by future acts."' 10 9
There were repeated references to this aspect of the proposal
throughout the debates. 110
Objections to the proposal were made on the basis that the
legislature already could act concerning labor-management problems under the police power and had authority to create inferior
courts."' In reply, it was stated that the powers of a mere court are
limited, and that this proposal would permit a combination of administrative, legislative and judicial powers. 11 2 An amendment to

109Statement of Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1937.
110Statements of Mr. Peterson, Id.

at 1975:

"...

you cannot, by legislative

act, establish a tribunal with these joint powers. That is the reason for
the proposal."; Mr. Ferneau, Id. at 1977: "That tribunal, whatever you
may call it, in order to be effective, in my opinion, must necessarily have
judicial, administrative or executive and legislative powers combined in
one tribunal in order to be an effective tribunal. Under the Judicial Department proposal they can create courts inferior to the Supreme Court,
but they could only have judicial powers. The legislature of course could
delegate to a commission legislative powers, but it cannot delegate to
them all these powers unless we give the legislature that authority.";
Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1998; Mr. Abbott, Id. at 2001; Mr. Bryant, Id. at 1956.
For earlier statements to the same effect, see Statements of Mr. Pitzer,
Id. at 1556; Mr. Donohoe, Id. at 1559. See also note 112 infra. There were
objections to this aspect of the proposal. See Statements of Mr. Bryant,
Id. at 1556; Mr. Votava, Id. at 1981: "That is the fundamental question at
stake in this proposal, and I am opposed to it and I do not think that
the Convention will be in favor of the creation of a commission with
such powers. Insofar as employers and employees and capital are concerned, this commission then would become the entire government; they
would make the rules; they would determine whether or not those rules
were violated, and they will enforce their judgments. .

.

. I do not think

we ought to give the legislature the power to go that far."
"'Statements of Mr. Kunz, Id. at 1549-50, 1561; Mr. Norman, Id. at 1551;
Mr. Lute, Id. at 1940.
"] 2 Statements of Mr. Donohoe, Id. at 1559: "In answer to the gentleman who
suggests that the judicial department committee in its report has made a
condition here that will cover this, I say it cannot, because that simply
provides for the court. We must have a commission that has quasilegislative and quasi-executive power.... ."; Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1940: "It
was also the opinion of the Committee that these men, in order to do the
things it was desired for them to do must have judicial, legislative and executive or administrative powers. The courts have held that the Legislature could not delegate judicial power to a Commission, and for that reason some provision of this character is necessary, in the estimation of the
Committee, to perform the duties required of them."; Mr. Flansburg, Id.
at 1949: "While an Industrial Court or a Court of Industrial Relations
could be created under the judiciary act, that court would have only
judicial powers; but this board, which this Miscellaneous Committee has
reported in favor of, a commission, if you please, will be endowed with
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of industrial relations instead of a commission
create only a court
113
was unsuccessful.
It was called to the attention of the convention that the Kansas
legislation which had inspired the Nebraska proposal had not required a constitutional provision.114 Again, the answer was made
that in Nebraska it was necessary to have constitutional authority
for the desired delegation of powers. 115 Article II, Section 1, was
specifically cited to the convention during these debates as a reason
why Article XV, Section 9, was necessary. 1 6 Later decisions corroborate the fear that an attempt to delegate nonjudicial duties
to a judicial body, as well as delegations of legislative powers without thorough standards to an administrative agency, thought to be
necessary for effective labor-management relations legislation by
the convention, will be invalidated under Article II, Section 1.117
But the legislature may act under Article XV, Section 9, to delegate
legislative and judicial powers to the Industrial Commission.
G. What is meant by ".. . investigation, submission and determina-

legislative, exeuctive and judicial power. That is why I favored it."; Mr.
TePoel, Id. at 1967: ". . this tribunal would exercise some executive,
judicial, administrative and quasi-judicial powers ....
Yes, sir, some of
the powers of government, using that term in the sense in which you use
it. Legislative, executive and judicial." Mr. Bigelow (opponent), Id. at
1994: "It has been said, and I think correctly, both by the gentleman from
Lancaster County, Mr. Peterson, and by the gentleman from Douglas
County, Mr. TePoel, that really the only necessity for the constitutional
provision is to pave the way for a tribunal with mixed powers. There is
nothing else in this proposal which could not be provided for under the
general legislative powers of the legislature."
113Proposal of Mr. Radke, Id. at 1552-53, 1961.
114Statements of Mr. Lute, Id. at 1940; Mr. Kunz, Id. at 1561; Governor
Allen of Kansas, Id. at 1637.
115Statements of Mr. Abbott, Id. at 2001: "With all due respect to Governor
Allen, of Kansas, if his Industrial Court in that state has no foundation
except a provision similar to that in our Constitution, it will fall when
attacked in the proper tribunal in the proper way, so that if we are to

have this kind of tribunal we must provide for it." This statement followed the reading of Article II, Section I.; Mr. Epperson, Id. at 1940
(stating the Nebraska committee's opinion that the Kansas legislation
was unconstitutional on this ground).
116 Statement of Mr. Abbott, Id. at 2001: "In the first place, gentlemen, if
you want to do anything of this kind it must be done in the Constitution.
It cannot be left to the Legislature. Section I of Article II of our Constitution says: (reads section)."
117See, e.g., Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227
(1960); Serle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N.W. 464 (1929), noted 8 NEB.
L. BULL. 449 (1930). See also, Cahill, The Separation of Powers in Nebraska, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 367 (1939).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
tion of controversies between employers and employees . . ."? The
phrase ".... investigation, submission and determination of controversies between employers and employees . . ." remained unamended, 118 and comparatively unconsidered, during the convention debates on the proposal. The Industrial Commission, of course,
can have only those powers which are given to it by legislative enactment. What this language boils down to is that the Industrial
Commission can be authorized by the legislature to handle the "entire treatment of the controversy"1' 19 down to the point of a final determination, but without enforcement powers beyond the final
120
determination.
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission may be made
mandatory upon the parties. Proposals to give the Commission
jurisdiction only upon application of one or both of the parties
failed to pass, 21 ' and so did a suggested amendment that the determination of the Commission be advisory only, absent such vol1 22
untary submission.
Both the proponent and opponents of the bill recognized that
the proposal would involve a power of compulsory arbitration of
the employer-employee dispute. 123 The legislature has invoked this
power of compulsory arbitration in the case of disputes in public
utilities and governmental services in a proprietary capacity.124 But
PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1318, 1936 (1920).
119 Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2455.
1182

120 See notes 137-39 infra.

' 21 Proposals of Mr. Sears,.2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1561, 1692 (1920):

" . . . upon application by either employer or employee, or by the state
when necessary to protect the public against interruption in public serv-

ice or in the operation of public utilities or in the production and distribution of commodities essential to the public safety and health . . .";
"... upon joint application by employer and employee... "; neither proposal came to a vote. See Proposals Nos. 220 and 237, note 33 supra.
122 See Proposal of Mr. Bigelow, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1547-48,
1992 (1920): " . . . to endeavor by investigation and recommendation to
promote conditions favorable to a settlement. .. ."

123 See Statements by Mr. Flansburg, Id. at 1947-49; Mr. Bigelow, Id. at

1546-47, 2460; Mr. Evans, Id. at 1942; Mr. Beeler, Id. at 2001. See also
Peterson, Industrial Courts, 3 NEB. L. BULL. 487, 499 (1925).
124NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-810 (Reissue 1960). See NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 48-802 (Reissue 1960). Note that the provisions of this act cannot constitutionally be applied where the National Labor Relations Board has

jurisdiction. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951). Article XV, Section

9, has not been implemented except in this limited situation. In a hurried
process to cope with a pending telephone strike, the limited bill was enacted at the request of the governor, and a bill providing for a fuller
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there is no language in the Constitution, and no constitutional history, limiting this extreme power to just those situations. The convention 12 5, and the legislature 1 26 have also regarded the section as
including a power to prevent strikes or lockouts during such a settlement. In the case of trade regulation, it is probable that the convention had had in mind that the Commission could engage in price
fixing27activities as one means of preventing unfair business prac1
tices.
It was generally assumed in the debates that the Industrial
Commission could be given any lesser sort of power relating to the
invesigation, submission and determination of controversies between employers and employees.12 8 From this, it would seem clear
that the Commission could be given the powers to handle representation matters and to decide unfair labor practice issues in a

implementation of the constitutional provision, applicable to all private
businesses affected with a public interest, which had been introduced by
one of the principal proponents of the provision at the 1920 Constitutional Convention,-was killed. See Neb. Leg. J., 60th Sess., pp. 267, 957,
958, 1063 (1947); L.B. 349, 60th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1947) (introduced by
Mr. Peterson). In its nearly fourteen years of existence, fifteen cases
have been docketed in the court. One appeal has been taken to the Nebraska Supreme Court, but it was dismissed prior to decision.
125 See Statements of Mr. Pitzer, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1556, 2456
(1920); Mr. Ferneau, Id. at 1978; Mr. Evans, Id. at 2004; Mr. Ream, Id. at
2457-58; Mr. Donohoe, Id. at 1560. There was a proposal to limit this
power. See Statements of Mr. Sears, Id. at 1554-55, 1561, 1692.
126NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-821 (Reissue 1960) (making it a felony to aid,
conspire for, or participate in, in any manner, a lockout, strike, slowdown, or other work stoppage which interferes with governmental service or any governmental service in a proprietary capacity or the service
of any public utility). An employee cannot be required to work without
his consent, or denied the right to quit or withdraw from his place of
employment unless done in concert or by agreement with others. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-822 (Reissue 1960). But the view was expressed at
the Constitutional Convention that persons working in these public utilities could be denied altogether their right to quit without notice, whether
done individually or in concert. See Statement of Mr. Peterson, 2 PROC.
2

NEB. CONST. CONV. 1564 (1920).
Satements of Mr. TePoel, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1966 (1920);
Mr. Peterson, Id. at 1976-77.

1 7Cf.

128See, e.g., Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2455:

"

. .

my view is that when

you say in lines 1 and 2, that laws may be enacted providing for the
investigation, submission and determination of such controversies, provision is made for the entire treatment of a controversy and the findings
of the commission, when you provide in lines 5 and 6 and 7, for an industrial commission, for the purpose of administering such laws, you
thereby give that commission such judicial power as is needed to that
extent." See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-123 (Reissue 1960).

: 678
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labor-management relations bill. 12 9 Border-line powers which the
Commission might be given, but upon which the convention history
is ambiguous, would involve the power to promulgate rules concerning general wage scales, hours of work, and working conditions. 130 The convention concensus that the extreme powers could
include compulsory arbitration of controversies, coupled with the
dominant intent of the convention to combine legislative, executive
and judicial functions in an Industrial Commission, seems persuasive in favor of permitting these powers as a matter of constitutional interpretation.131
There is no contemporaneous history of the intended meaning
of the terms "controversies," "employers," or "employees." Consistent with the scope which has been attributed to the phrase "investigation, submission and determination," the word "controversies" in this section should be read quite broadly so as not to require an existing, or even threatened, dispute between specific
employers and employees. This, too, would seem to be in keeping
with the underlying intent of the convention, and with the description of "controversies" in the plural and "employers" and
"employees" as classes rather than as individual participants in a
specific dispute.
The terms "employers" and "employees" must have been em-

29But the bills introduced in recent legislative sessions have not utilized
the Industrial Commission. See notes 44 and 45 supra. The reason for
this may be the limitation to "affected with a public interest."
130 See Statements of Governor Allen of Kansas, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST.

CONV. 1627 (1920): The Kansas Industrial Court was given combined
powers so that it could not only adjudicate, but " . . . go out and adjust
wage conditions, make wage conditions right, and fix minimum wage

scales. That goes further than mere judicial power. It has the power to
create conditions for the future."; Mr. Flansburg, Id. at 1949 (power
would also include authority to require safety appliances for machinery
and health protection); Mr. TePoel, Id. at 1552. This would also appear
to involve a power to make independent investigations of specific dis-

putes or industrial conditions generally, either upon petition or its own
initiative. The present Court of Industrial Relations may make temporary findings and issue temporary orders on its own motion. See note
142 infra. But a petition must be filed by "Any employer, employee, or

labor organization, or the Attorney General of Nebraska on his own
*initiative or by order of the Governor, when any industrial dispute exists
between the parties. . .

."

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-811 (Reissue 1960).

131 In a later portion of this article, it is recognized that the powers granted
on the face of Article XV, Section 9, may, themselves, be invalidated on
other constitutional grounds. To the extent that might be applicable to
the powers suggested here, the familiar rule of interpretation so as to
preserve constitutionality should be applied.
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ployed in a traditional master-servant context. There was no indication that this part of Article XV, Section 9, was meant to apply to
bona fide independent contractor situations. In drawing the precarious line between employment and independent contract, the legislature and court would be justified, in my opinion, in utilizing either
the same basic criteria as has been employed in other Nebraska
social legislation such as workmen's compensation or unemployment
compensation,' 32 or the more liberal sort of "economic dependence"
133
test applied under some comparable federal legislation.
H. Can the Industrial Commission be given "enforcement" powers?
From the history of Article XV, Section 9, it appears that an Industrial Commission can have enforcement powers up to the point
of its final determination, but that the final determination, once
made by the Commission, can be enforced only in the courts. At a
time when the constitutional proposal appeared to have passed its
major hurdles, had been passed on second reading and had been
reported back by the Committee on Arrangement and Phraseology,
the last sentence stated, "An Industrial Commission may be created
for the purpose of administering and enforcing such laws .. .
An amendment was adopted deleting the words "and enforcing."'13 5
The proposer explained that the purpose for this amendment was so
that ".... the power of enforcement should not be in the commission.
That is to say the power of enforcement of the laws which the commission is to administer ought properly be left to the law courts.' 1 36
132 See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-106, 48-114, 48-115, 48-605 (Reissue 1960);
Snodgrass v. City of Holdrege, 166 Neb. 329, 89 N.W.2d 66 (1958) (tree
trimmer); Schneider v. Village of Shickley, 156 Neb. 683, 57 N.W.2d 527
(1953) (electrician); Nollett v. Holland Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538, 4 N.W.
2d 554 (1942) (roofing applicators); Hill Hotel v. Kinney, 138 Neb. 760,
295 N.W. 397 (1940) (dance band members).
133 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S.
111 (1944) (newsboys covered by National Labor Relations Act); United

States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947)

(coal unloaders, but not driver-own-

ers or cross-country truckmen, covered by social security); Rutherford
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (meat boners employees of

slaughterhouse under Fair Labor Standards Act); Ringling Bros. v.
Higgins, 189 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1951) (circus acts employees under Federal Unemployment Tax Act). The "applicator" cases have split under

federal legislation. Other than the Fair Labor Standards Act, the fed-

eral legislation has been amended to state a common law test, but this

has not produced a noticeable change in the lower federal court decisions
and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled under the amendments.
1342 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 2453 (1920).
135Id. at 1459 (by vote of 51 to 36).
136Statements of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2454, 2481. He had previously raised the
same objection. Id. at 1556, 1998.
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He stated that by "administering such laws," the Commission could
enforce the laws up to the point of a determination, but it could
not fix a penalty or apply any other process resulting upon a final
determination. 137 Up to the point of a final determination, the Commission would apparently have power to enforce its orders as a part
of the general administration of such laws. 138 The Commission could
enter a final determination which carries a penalty, but it could not
enforce that penalty. 1 39 The reason for this division of administranecestive and enforcement powers was that the tribunal should not
40
sarily be composed of lawyers or of men versed in the law.1
If this interpretation is correct, then the present Court of Industrial Relations is an example of the "administrative" powers of
Aricle XV, Section 9, pushed virtually to their fullest extent, 141 but

137Id. at 2455, 2480-81: "Mr. Abbott: Is the following your interpretation
of the word 'administer;' that it includes 'the investigation, submission
and determination of controversies up to the point of a final decision,
and not beyond that?' Mr. Pitzer: I have stated that that is my interpretation of it several times on this floor. Mr. Abbott: And if this Proposal
No. 333 as now amended by the Convention is adopted, is it your understanding that that is the purpose of the proposal? Mr. Pitzer: To grant
all of the powers necessary from the beginning of the investigation to

the entering of the findings and making the determination. Mr. Abbott:
But not the enforcing of the decision whatever it may be? Mr. Pitzer:
No. Mr. Weaver: .

.

. Your understanding then is that the enforcement of

any of the orders of this Commission shall be for the courts? Mr. Pitzer:
Yes."
138Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2481. See Report of Joint Committee of
the Committees of Miscellaneous Subjects and Industrial Conditions, Id.
at 1910-11: "It is our judgment that a tribunal in the form of a commission with combined administrative, legislative and judicial powers, is the
proper governmental agency to be entrusted with the powers and duties
to be granted, and prescribed, the judicial power to extend to making
findings and orders, leaving measures of enforcement by penalties or
summary process with the judicial department of the state government."
139Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2457.
40
1 Statement of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 2457. But the argument was also made
that deletion of the words "and enforcing" would not deprive the Commission of enforcement powers if the word "administering" was left in.
See Statements of Mr. Flansburg (proponent), Id. at 2458, and Mr. Bigelow (opponent), Id. at 2460. A further attempt was made to delete the
phrase "of administering," so that the sentence would have read, "An
industrial court may be created for said purposes...

,"

but it was de-

feated. Id. at 2475-2479.
141 In addition to its present powers, the Court of Industrial Relations could
probably be given authority to enforce its temporary orders. These temporary orders are now enforceable only in the district courts. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-819 (Reissue 1960). But cf. Statements of Mr. Peterson,
2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 2004, 2454 (1920), opposing deletion of the
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stopping short of "enforcement." On its own initiative, the court
may issue temporary findings and orders pending a final determination of the issues. 142 It may also order that collective bargaining be
commenced or resumed in public utilities. 143 After a hearing, it may
enter orders establishing or altering wages, hours or conditions of
employment, and may modify such orders on its own motion or on
an application by any of the parties affected upon a showing of a
change in circumstances. 4 4 Orders of the Court of Industrial Relations, whether temporary or final, are given the same force and effect as like orders of a Nebraska district court, but they are enforceable only in the district courts.145 Unlike the status of orders of
the National Labor Relations Board on the federal level, however,
failure to comply with a Court of Industrial Relations order may
be punishable as contempt in an action in a district court. 146 In the
words of the Constitutional Convention, the Court of Industrial
Relations acts to the point at which a final determination is made

word "enforcing" because this would require the Nebraska Commission,

like the Kansas Industrial Court, to go into District Court to compel attendance of witnesses, testimony, the examination of records, or the production of evidence.
142 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816 (Reissue 1960) "The court shall have power
and authority upon its own initiative to make such temporary findings
and orders as may be necessary to preserve and protect the status of
the parties, property and public interest involved, pending final determination of the issues." The Court has power to compel attendance and
testimony of witnesses and to subpoena books, records and correspondence. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-815 (Reissue 1960).
143NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816 (Reissue 1960).
144NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-818 (Reissue 1960) (containing legislative standards for wage determinations).
145NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-819 (Reissue 1960).
146NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-819 (Reissue 1960): "Failure on the part of any
person to obey any order, decree or judgment of the Court of Industrial
Relations, either temporary or final, shall constitute a contempt of such
tribunal in all cases where a similar failure to obey a similar order, decree or judgment of a district court would constitute a contempt of such
tribunal, and upon application to the appropriate district court of the state
shall be dealt with as would a similar contempt of the said district court."
This appears to be the most debatable part of the enforcement powers of
the present Court of Industrial Relations. Whether the entry of a final
determination which is in the form of injunctive relief, punishable by
contempt, is "determination" or "enforcement" is highly questionable.
Arguably, the sort of relief which carries with it punishment by contempt for its violation constitutes "enforcement" and not mere administration. Cf. Statement of Mr. Pitzer, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV.
1556 (1920): " . . . I believe it is the view of the members of the com-

mittee that an industrial court should probably not have the power of
injunction ......
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and a penalty is imposed, in the form of a contempt for refusal to
14
abide by the determination (or appeal to the Supreme Court), 7
but the district court must enforce all orders of the Court of Industrial Relations and punish for any contempt of an order of the Court
of Industrial Relations.
I. What are the general constitutional limitations upon an exercise
of the powers under Article XV, Section 9? The provisions of Article XV, Section 9, may themselves be subject to federal and state
constitutional limitations which would prevent the section from
being used to the fullest extent its terms would literally permit.
In its broadest sense, this section would allow compulsory arbitration of labor disputes and the power to limit the rights to picket,
strike, slowdown, lockout, quit work, discharge, or engage in other
activities during the determination of the controversy.
Opponents of the proposal at the Constitutional Convention
expressed the fear that the section would abrogate other rights
granted by the Nebraska Constitution, especially the Bill of
Rights. 4 " The proponents denied this assertion. They reasoned
that no constitutional provision overrides the statement of individual rights, but that individual rights must accommodate themselves in certain instances so as not to be exercised in a manner
inimical to the general public interest; the individual rights are
not abrogated, but are merely subordinated to a degree in the interests of the public cause. 149 A specific amendment to add a proviso that, "This section shall not be construed to abrogate rights
guaranteed elsewhere in this Constitution," was defeated.'5 0
The federal constitutional guarantees are, of course, controlling,
even concerning a state constitutional provision. But it is submitted that the essential question of the accommodation which must
be made with respect to what may be competing constitutional
rights is basically the same whether the federal constitutional
"rights" or state constitutional "rights" are involved.
How the United States Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme Court might approach the problem and resolve the underlying issues of accommodation 'or balancing of rights might be
markedly different, however. The United States Supreme Court has

147NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-812 (Reissue 1960).
148 See Statements of Mr. Bigelow, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1546, 1549,
2460, 2473-74, 2721 (1920).

149 See Statements of Mr. Pitzer, Id. at 1557, 2474.
150 Amendment of Mr. Bigelow, Id. at 2459, 2373, 2475 (by a vote of 63 to
23). The proposal itself carried by votes of 54 to 28 on first reading 63 to
22 on second reading; and 71 to 21 on final reading. Id. at 2004, 2161, 2721.
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shown a considerably greater inclination to permit a legislative determination of the balance. The Nebraska Court might well utilize
the doctrine of substantive due process of law,1'51 now abandoned on
the federal level. A Nebraska opinion would probably on its face
give a greater weight to so-called individual and property rights and
less to the alleged public rights than would an opinion on the same
legislation by the United States Supreme Court. To the extent the
litigation involved a balancing of an asserted personal right with an
asserted property right, the Nebraska Court might be more liberal
in favor of the property right than the United States Supreme
Court.
Neither Court has ruled definitely concerning compulsory arbitration of labor disputes and the incidental aspects of limitations
on economic pressures in the meantime. It is likely that either Court
would uphold an Act such as the Nebraska Court of Industrial Relations statute'5 2 calling for compulsory arbitration of public utility
labor disputes and labor disputes involving a governmental function
in a proprietory capacity. The Kansas Industrial Court Act was held
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court because of its
compulsory arbitration aspect as applied to packing plants and coal
1

5See, e.g., Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 785-88, 104 N.W.

2d 227, 233-34 (1960); Blauvelt v. Beck, 162 Neb. 576, 585, 76 N.W.2d
738, 745 (1956). See also Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and
Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 13, 226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process In The States, 34 MINN.
L. REV. 91 (1950).
152NEB. REV. STAT. § § 48-801 to 823 (Reissue 1960). Nine states have
comparable state legislation providing for some form of compulsory
arbitration. See 4 B.N.A. LAB. REL. REP. par. SLL 1:26, Table 7 (1956).
New Jersey adopted an act requiring arbitration of public utility labor
disputes in 1946, and five other states, Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, acted in the public utility field in 1947. The Kansas Industrial Court Act of 1920 is still on the books and may be applicable to public utilities. A Minnesota statute provides for compulsory
arbitration of labor disputes involving charitable hospitals. Missouri law
provides for recommendations followed by possible seizure and public
operation of utilities. In general, these statutes have been held constitutional. See, e.g., N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950); Fairview Hospital Ass'n v. Public Bldg.
Serv. & Hosp. Inst. Employees, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954);
United Gas Workers v. Wisconsin Empl't Rel. Bd., 255 Wis. 154, 38 N.W.
2d 692 (1949). But it is recognized that they cannot be applied to utilities
affecting interstate commerce. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Electric Ry.
Employees v. Wisconsin Empl't Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Henderson
v. State, 65 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1953); Marshall v. Schricker, 28 L.R.R.M. 2167
(Ind. Cir. Ct. 1951); Op. Mo. Att'y Gen, 27 L.R.R.M. 69 (1951). And some
statutes have been held invalid on the basis of an unconstitutional dele-

gation of powers. See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 432, 444-49 (1957).
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mines on the basis that these businesses were not charged with a
public interest for the purpose of this regulation. 153 Inferentially,
these opinions would have permitted compulsory arbitration had
the compulsory arbitration been limited to public utilities or governmental service in a proprietary capacity. 5 4 Arguably, Nebraska
has acquiesced in this aspect of the Kansas Industrial Court deci155
sions.
Where the two Courts might split on this issue is illustrated by
the employment agency fee regulation cases. In this litigation, the
United States Supreme Court, reversing the Nebraska Supreme
Court, overruled one of its own earlier decisions, again repudiated
the business affected with a public interest test, and held the Nebraska employment agency fee statute constitutional. 56 Upon relitigation in the Nebraska Supreme Court, however, the Court upheld the power of the legislature to regulate employment agencies
and upheld the entire method of the regulation, but struck down
the maximum fee provision under the Nebraska Constitution on
the basis that the legislative means was arbitrary, capricious and

153Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535-39

(1923), as
distinguished in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 n. 39 (1934).
154See Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535-39 (1923);
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U.S. 552, 567 (1925): "Care
was taken to point out that operating a railroad, keeping an inn, conducting an elevator and following a common calling are not all in the
same class, and particularly to point out the distinctions between a quasipublic business conducted under a public grant imposing a correlative
duty to operate, a business originally private which comes to be affected with a public interest through a change in pais, and a business
which not only was private in the beginning but remained such." See
Simpson, Constitutional Limitations on Compulsory Arbitration, 38
HARV. L. REV. 753, 775-76 (1925).
1 55
See Boomer v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 586-87, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (1943):
" . . . except in a business in which the owner by devoting it to a public
use, in effect, grants the public an interest in the use and subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest. Included in the
exception are railroads, bus lines, street car lines, and similar businesses
in which the extent of the public interest is such as to require protection
from duplication and competition, and a fixing of rates and charges as
a matter growing out of and reciprocal thereto."
156 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), reversing 138 Neb. 574, 293 N.W.
393 (1940). In the anti-closed shop amendment decision, the Nebraska
Court quoted the language from this case in note 73 supra that the Court
is not concerned with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 149 Neb. 507, 511, 31 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1948).
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unreasonable as applied to employment agencies. 157 From this, it
is possible to draw an inference that the United States Supreme
Court would uphold a general scheme of compulsary arbitration of
labor disputes for a class of businesses, including employment agencies, over which the Nebraska Supreme Court would strike down
the statute under the Nebraska Constitution. There is no essential
difference between the accommodation which the police power
under the Nebraska Constitution must make to the other constitutional rights and that required of Aricle XV, Section 9.
The relatively recent decision concerning the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act' 58 also indicates a difference in approach to labor matters between the two Courts. There, a unanimous
Nebraska Supreme Court, reversed by a unanimous United States
Supreme Court, held that the union shop provision violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it was unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious, and had no real relationship to the legislative objective, and also contravened First Amendment rights of
nonunion members. 59 We might also expect these Courts to disagree
on the extent to which a state can prohibit peaceful picketing during
an industrial dispute. The United States Supreme Court would
probably still find that peaceful picketing involves free speech and
could not be absolutely prohibited. 160 In putting greater emphasis
on the rights of employers and nonunion employees, the Nebraska
Supreme Court might be less inclined to emphasize the free speach
aspect of picketing.
The rulings of the Courts on the limitations on the rights to
strike or lockout would depend initially on the same sort of factors involved in the compulsory arbitration question. At least on
the state level, there would be an additional issue whether the
limiting statute provided enough of a mechanism for solving the
underlying labor problem as to constitute due process of law. An
absolue prohibition on discharge for cause or voluntary quits during
settlement of the controversy is apt to be invalidated by either
Court, with the Nebraska Supreme Court taking a considerably
broader view as to when contemporaneous voluntary quitting may
157 Boomer v. Olson, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N.W.2d 507 (1943). Note that the
social and economic conditions existing at the time the right is asserted

rather than at the time the Constitution was adopted is controlling. See
note 101 supra.
15864 Stat. 1238 (1951), U.S.C. § 152 "Eleventh" (1958).
159Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), reversing 160
Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
16OFor a discussion of the cases, see GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW
c. XI (2d ed. 1958).
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become a strike. The Courts might also disagree on whether a
concerted bona fide quit could be prohibited, even in cases involving public utilities, during the settlement of the controversy.
On what is a more realistic level, it is not likely that either
Court would impose constitutional objections on the basis of due
process to a general labor-management relations act providing for
an enforceable system of collective bargaining through representation and unfair labor practice procedures, and applicable generally
to all businesses or vocations. This would undoubtedly be a more
difficult case for the Nebraska Supreme Court, however, which
would need to distinguish its union shop objections of due process
and right of assembly under the Nebraska Constitution as applied
to a statutory bargaining agent. 16 1
Generally, then, we might conclude that the Nebraska Supreme
Court is apt to prescribe a smaller area for permissible activity
under Article XV, Section 9, than the United States Supreme Court.
Just where either line would actually be drawn must await specific legislation and litigation.
III. LIMITATIONS ON ENFORCEABILITY OF
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Most collective labor argreements contain grievance machinery
which ends in arbitration with respect to disputes that arise during
the existence of the agreement. This seems to be the normal, accontroversies
cepted and most advantageous method of resloving
16 2
during the term of the collective agreement.
In Nebraska, however, a provision to arbitrate all disputes
arising under a contract, 163 or even merely the amount of loss or
damages,' 6 4 will be enforced, and a refusal to arbitrate is not a de161 Hanson v. Union Pacific R.R., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W. 526 (1955), rev'd 351
U.S. 225 (1956). The Nebraska Court is, of course, the final arbiter of

the Nebraska Constitution.

16 2 See Levett, Lawyers, Legalism and Labor Arbitration, 4 N.Y. L. F. 379,
381 (1960): "... . labor arbitration has received such apparent public ac-

ceptance that today more than 90% of our collective bargaining agreements provide in one fashion or another for arbitration of disputes as to
the interpretation or application of the agreement."
163See, e.g., Union Ins. Co. v Barwick, 36 Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519 (1893)
(agreement to arbitrate "any question, matter, or thing, except the validity of the contract or the liability of this company").
164The earliest Nebraska case invalidating an arbitration clause was such a
case. German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406
(1889) (clause to arbitrate "loss or damage to property partially or
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fense to an action growing out of the contract. 165 The award of an
arbitrator does become enforceable once made upon a voluntary
and unrevoked submission of the parties. 166
From an early date, the Nebraska Court has held that unexecuted agreements to arbitrate claims under an insurance policy, 67
a private contract,'168 or a collective labor agreement, 69 are invalid.
The reason assigned initially seemed to be the common law concept'70 of invasion of the jurisdiction of the courts.' 7 ' Later opinions
totally destroyed"). Also see Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,
153 Neb. 160, 174, 43 N.W.2d 657, 665 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812
(1951).
16 5 See, e.g., National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 268, 62 N.W.
466, 470 (1895); see also notes 167-169 infra.
160See, e.g., Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 49 Neb. 740, 745, 69 N.W.
118, 119 (1896); "An award, whether under the statute or at common
law, is, in the absence of fraud or mistake, binding upon the parties thereto, and the burden of alleging and proving its invalidity rests upon the
party seeking to impeach it."; Bentley v. Davis, 21 Neb. 685, 33 N.W. 475

(1887).

167 German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 41 N.W. 406 (1889);
Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519 (1893); German
Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 N.W. 856 (1893); Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Bean, 42 Neb. 537, 60 N.W. 907 (1894); National Masonic Acc. Ass'n
v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N.W. 466 (1895); Ins. Co. of North America v.
Bachler, 44 Neb. 549, 62 N.W. 911 (1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb. 138, 66 N.W. 278 (1896); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49
Neb. 811, 69 N.W. 125 (1896); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555,
92 N.W. 746 (1902); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736
(1902).
168 Schrandt v. Young, 62 Neb. 254, 86 N.W. 1085 (1901); Havens v. Robertson, 75 Neb. 205, 106 N.W. 335 (1905); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake &
Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W. 2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812
(1951).
169Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934).
17OFor a discussion of the common law rules generally, see Gregory and
Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CHI.
L. REV. 233, 235-38 (1950); Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 247 (1958). The common law
distinction between agreements to arbitrate all future disputes and a provision limited to damages only is considered and rejected in Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902).
171See, e.g., German-American Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 25 Neb. 505, 508, 41
N.W. 406 (1889); Union Ins. Co. v. Barwick, 36 Neb. 223, 54 N.W. 519
(1893); German Ins. Co. v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461, 54 N.W. 856 (1893) (relying
in part on overriding provisions of insurance statutes where total loss was
involved); National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Burr, 44 Neb. 256, 62 N.W. 466,
(1895); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47 Neb. 138, 66 N.W. 278 (1896)
(stating that the failure to specify a particular person or tribunal as
arbitrator leaves the agreement to arbitrate wholly revocable).
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have placed reliance upon the specific constitutional provisions
in the Nebraska Bill of Rights that, "All courts shall be open, and
every person, for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without denial or delay,"'17 2 and that, "The right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ....
Both logically and practically, these positions seem indefensible.
Arbitration is consensual only. There can be no arbitration without
agreement of the parties, and the arbitrator can decide only those
issues which the parties have consented to his arbitrating. By
arbitration, the parties are effectuating their agreement rather than
remedying its breach. In reality, prior to the time the arbitration
has been carried out, there has been no damage or injury to anyone.
The parties are receiving precisely that for which they have
nor the right
bargained, and neither the jurisdiction of the court
174
of trial by jury would seem to have been violated.
The case for labor arbitration in the current field of industrial
relations is especially strong. The subject matters of most controversies handled under the grievance procedure are not the sort
of things suited to litigation in court, and the court process is illsuited to their effective resolution.'7 5 This is not to say, however,
that every disagreement between labor and management during
the existence of a collective agreement should be handled by
arbitration. But labor arbitration, as usually employed by the
parties, serves an entirely different purpose than commercial arbitration. Whereas commercial arbitration is a direct substitute for
litigation, labor arbitration is intended as a sort of industrial self-

172NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13. See Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb.
493, 253 N.W. 694 (1934); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W.
736 (1902); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902).
173NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555,
92 N.W. 746 (1902); Pheonix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 588-89, 92
N.W. 736, 737-38 (1902) (Pound, C., concurring): "I do not think the
constitutional provision with reference to trial by jury has any bearing

upon the question involved in this case. The same provision is to be
found in the constitution of the United States and in the constitutions
of several states. ..."
174 For the Court's answer to this line of reasoning, in a case considering an
arbitration clause with respect to loss or damage, see Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N.W. 746 (1902). For an approach similar to

that of the text, however, see notes 176, 183 and 184 infra.
175 See Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482
(1959); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955): "I suggest that the law stay out-

but, mind you, not the lawyers."
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government to handle labor relations problems in the most ex17 6
peditious and effective manner.
Having committed itself to the proposition that an agreement
to arbitrate is invalid under the Nebraska Constitution, it may now
be impossible for the Court to reject the common-law limitations
on labor arbitration clauses, as distinguished from commercial
arbitration generally, as has been done by some courts, on the
ground that these rules are meaningless in terms of current labor
conditions. 177 And in the face of these same constitutional limita176

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-82 (1960): "A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective
bargaining agreement. .

.

. In

the commercial case, arbitration is the

substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different functions
from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no
place here. For arbitration of labor disputes is part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself. The collective bargaining agreement
states the rights and duties of the parties. It is more than a contract;
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate .... Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference
to the practices of the particular industry and of the various shops
covered by the agreement. Many of the specific practices which underlie
the agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form, even to the negotiators. Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial contracts are resorted to because there has been a breakdown in the working
relationship of the parties; such resort is the unwanted exception. But
the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at
the very heart of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all
problems which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery
is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.... The labor arbitrator performs func-

tions which are not normal to the courts; the considerations which help
him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the competence of
courts.... The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their
trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are

not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. .

.

. The ablest

judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence
to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be
similarly informed." See note 175 supra. For a more restrained view, see
Livingston, Arbitration: Evaluation of Its Role in Labor Relations, 12th
ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 109 (1959).
177 See discussion in United Ass'n of Journ. & App. of Plumbing v. Stine, 351
P.2d 965, 977 (Nev. 1960): "We have noted what appears to us to be an
ever-increasing trend to depart from or to abrogate the common-law rule,
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tions, there is little that the legislature can do by way of statutory
enactment in this area. 178 Article XV, Section 9, can be construed
to authorize the legislature to set up a binding private arbitration
system enforceable by an Industrial Commission,'1 79 but that section,
itself, contains serious limitations. The parties to any industrial
dispute could today refer the dispute by mutual agreement to the
and the reasons for such trend .... This court does not suffer from the
embarrassment of the courts that have felt impelled to bow to stare
decisis in their own jurisdictions." But cf. Machine Products Co. v. Prairie
Local Lodge No. 1538, 230 Miss. 809, 827-28, 94 So.2d 344, 350 (1957).
178it is interesting to note that Nebraska has a general arbitration act on
the books which dates back into the territorial laws, and applies to any
civil action which can be litigated in court. NEB. REV. STAT. § 252103 to -2120 (Reissue 1956). This act is not suitable to routine labor
arbitration because the parties must specify particularly in writing what
demands are to be submitted, the names of the arbitrators, and the court
by which the judgment on their award is to be rendered. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-2104 (Reissue 1956). Either party may revoke the submission
at any time before the award is made, and possibly even if the arbitrators
may have themselves decided the issue but have merely not delivered
their written (and signed) opinion. See Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280,
68 N.W. 496 (1896). And the failure to comply with the technical procedure of the statute renders an award invalid, even following a voluntary
submission. See Burkland v. Johnson, 50 Neb. 858, 70 N.W. 388 (1897)
(voluntary submission agreement acknowledged by notary public rather
than justice of peace). But it is significant, nevertheless, that some form
of arbitration has been considered useful throughout the history of Nebraska, and that to this extent there has been no unconstitutional invasion of the jurisdiction of the courts. See also Hughes v. Sarpy County,
97 Neb. 90, 149 N.W. 309 (1914): "Submissions of controversies to arbitration are to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the intention
of the parties. It is the policy of the law to encourage the settlement of
disputes without litigation, and awards are favored in law." Held: county
boards have authority to submit matters to arbitration either under
statute "or the principles of the common law"; award irrevocable when
signed and given to one arbitrator for delivery, even though delivery to
parties not completed. It seems doubtful whether an attempt to amend
this statute to provide generally for labor arbitration could withstand
constitutional attack, although such an amendment has been proposed.
Cf. L.B. 708, 69th Neb. Leg., Sess. § 15, p. 16 (1959); L.B. 670, 72d Neb.
Leg. Sess. § 7(1), pp. 6-7 (1961).
179This would constitute "the investigation, submission and determination
of controversies between employers and employees." The section would
seem to allow the legislature to permit the Industrial Commission, itself,
whether acting in its judicial capacity or otherwise, to act as arbitrator
under a private agreement. See note 180 infra. But the Industrial Commission would have no more authority under the Nebraska Constitution
than a regular court to appoint an arbitrator or enforce a private arbitration award. Article XV, Section 9, would not seem to allow a delega-.
tion of arbitration powers to others in violation of the open court provisions of the Constitution.
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Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration, with the consent of
the court. 80 The legislature does not now seem to have power to
provide generally for the enforcement of labor arbitration clauses
by Nebraska district courts.""1
By contrast, the federal law is that arbitration arrangements
are favored in labor relations, and clauses to arbitrate are given
the broadest possible scope by the federal courts. Doubts are resolved in favor of coverage of the arbitration clause.18 2 Even arbitration of apparently frivolous claims will be ordered because of
the theraputic effect in industrial relations, 8 3 and an award of an
' 80 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-820 (Reissue 1960): "Any industrial dispute,
not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under sections 48-801 to 48-823, may by mutual agreement in writing, signed by
.the parties thereto and with the consent of the court, be referred to the
Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration. Upon such referral the court
shall investigate, hear and determine such industrial dispute." This does
not make an agreement to arbitrate specifically enforceable. Should one
party refuse to join in an application to the Court of Industrial Relations
at the time the particular dispute were to be submitted, the Court would
not have jurisdiction. But this statute may be unconstitutional. It was
enacted under Article XV, Section 9. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-802
(Reissue 1960). But its jurisdiction under section 48-820 is not limited
to businesses or vocations affected with a public interest. One of the
objections made to the proposed Article XV, Section 9, on the floor of the
Constitutional Convention was the unanswered assertion that the section
would not permit the Commission to undertake to investigate and
publicize or to mediate (rather than arbitrate) controversies where the
business was not affected with a public interest. Statement of Mr.
Bigelow, 2 PROC. NEB. CONST. CONV. 1993-94 (1920).
181See note 178 supra. Action could be taken under the first sentence of
Article XV, Section 9. But it might not only be subject to the same
constitutional objections as action taken under the judicial power, but
as an unconstitutional delegation of powers. A Michigan statute was
held unconstitutional for delegating authority to a judge to act as a
compulsory arbitrator because this gave administrative authority to a
judicial officer. Local 170 v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W.2d 71 (1948).
182 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960): "An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should
not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."
18 3 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
567-68 (1960): "The collective agreement requires arbitration of claims
that courts might be unwilling to entertain. In the context of the plant
or industry the grievance may assume proportions of which judges are
ignorant. Yet, the agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration,
not merely those that a court may deem to be meritorious. .

.

. The

question is not whether in the mind of the court there is equity in the
claim. Arbitration is a stablizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle
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arbitrator will be enforced if at all reasonable.8 4
These federal rules constitute a federal body of substantive
law of labor relations, controlling with respect to collective agreements entered into under the federal labor law.18 5 United States
district courts have jurisdiction to compel or enforce arbitration
without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard
to diversity of citizenship of the parties. 80 Thus, Nebraska parties
to a collective agreement entered into under the National Labor
Relations Act can secure enforcement of an arbitration provision
in a Nebraska United States district court.
In fact, itseems quite possible that a party can enforce arbitration under a collective agreement entered into under federal
labor law in a Nebraska district court. It is generally assumed
that state courts may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal
courts in enforcing the collective agreements entered into under the
National Labor Relations Act, although in so doing the Nebraska
courts would be bound by the federal substantive law. 187 The
district courts of Nebraska have general civil and equitable

for handling any and all disputes that arise under the agreement .... In
our role of developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, we think
special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to
serve ... ." The law of some states is to the contrary. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917,
67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
184United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 596, 599 (1960): "The federal policy of settling labor disputes
by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards. * * * Itis the arbitrator's construction which was
bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction
of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their
interpretation of the contract is different from his."
85
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353
U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957): "The question then is, what is the substantive
law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a)? We conclude that the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws ....
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law ....
But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted
to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy....
Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will
not be an independent source of private rights."
186 National Labor Relations Act § 301(a), added by 61 Stat. 156 (1947),

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).

187 See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 363
U.S. 448 (1957); McCarroll v. Los Angeles Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
jurisdiction, both by the Constitution1 8 8 and by statute.18 9 This
power would appear to permit a Nebraska district court to entertain a suit to enforce or determine rights under a federal contract,
even if the specific right happens to be arbitration. At least, if the
Nebraska arbitration cases are construed as a jurisdictional limitation on the power of the Nebraska district courts to compel or
enforce arbitration, rather than as rendering the contractual provisions void as the cases say on their faces, then this is a subject
all the more suited to constitutional revision.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that where arbitration
is sought in Nebraska courts under the Federal Arbitration Act,190
the issue is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and the
Nebraska prohibitions against arbitration are controlling. 19' As

Cal.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Courtney
v. Charles Dowd Box Co., 169 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Mass. 1960), cert. granted,
81 Sup. Ct. 699 (1961): "The conferring of jurisdiction in actions at law
upon the appropriate District Courts of the United States is not, in and of
itself, a deprivation of an existing jurisdiction both at law and in equity
in State courts ....
In the absence of a clear holding by the Supreme
Court of the United States that Federal jurisdiction has been made
exclusive, we shall not make what would be tantamount to an abdication of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own courts."; Local
Lodge No. 774 v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 186 Kan. 569, 352 P.2d 420 (1960).
188 NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9.
189NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-302 (Reissue 1956).
19043 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 14 (1958).
191Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657
(1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951). This decision rested on the
procedural unenforceability of arbitration clauses and not upon a limitation of the jurisdiction of Nebraska district courts. But cf. Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics. Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406, 409 (2d
Cir. 1959), cert granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), cert. dismissed, 81 Sup. Ct. 27
(1960): "We think it is reasonably clear that the Congress intended by
the Arbitration Act to create a new body of federal substantive law
affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements. ...
We hold that the body of law thus created is substantive not procedural
in character and that it encompasses questions of interpretation and
construction as well as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs, since these two types of legal questions are inextricably
intertwined."; noted in 60 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 229 (1960): "While no
case authority exists in the thirty-four years of the act's history for the
conclusion that section 2 of the act establishes a rule of law binding in
state as well as federal courts, both the wording of the statute and the
legislative history support this conclusion."; and in 73 HARV. L. REV.
1382, 1385 (1960): "It is arguable that if a state does not provide the
necessary enforcement procedures, its courts will not be required to grant
any relief."
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applied to labor arbitration agreements, this holding would appear
to be inapplicable and erroneous. Whether technically labeled as
procedural or substantive, a valid arbitration provision contained
in an enforceable contract under a foreign law, should be enforced
by the local forum, since it affects the meritorious outcome of the
litigation. 192 And insofar as arbitration under a federal collective
agreement is concerned, this involves a subject over which the
parties are required to bargain, 193 (in fact, it is considered as a part
and, as such, is a part
of the collective bargaining process, itself) ,'194
of the "substantive" federal law of labor relations which is controlling as a matter of federal preemption over inconsistent state
provisions. 195
There are several reasons why the matter of labor arbitration
should be considered for constitutional revision. The present
limitations on labor arbitration are out of keeping with sound industrial policy. Some of the present constitutional provisions have
apparently taken on a meaning in this regard which now works
against their basic purpose of effectively resolving disagreements
between interested persons. There seems to be no real reason for
differentiating insofar as arbitration is concerned between parties
covered by federal labor contract law and Nebraska labor contract
law, whether the issue is raised in a federal court or in a Nebraska
court. As a minimum, the whole subject of labor arbitration in
Nebraska is one for legislative policymaking in the light of modern
day industrial conditions, and the Constitution should permit such a
legislative determination.

19 2 Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202-205 (1956)
(diversity jurisdiction decision refusing to order arbitration in Vermont
federal court under a Vermont contract where arbitration could not be
compelled in the Vermont courts, but without labeling arbitration as
"substantive").
93

1 See, e.g., United Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951).
194See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.,

363 U.S. 574, 578, 581 (1960): "For arbitration of labor disputes under
collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself. . . . The grievance procedure is, in other
words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining process. It,
rather than a strike, is the terminal point of a disagreement."; United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
the arbitrators under these collective agreements are
596 (1960): " ...
indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process."
195 See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283 (1959), and 363 U.S. 605 (1960)
(holding that mandatory subjects
of bargaining under federal labor relations statutes supersede state
antitrust restrictions). See also Note, State Enforcement of Federally
Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1960).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Continued industrialization will underscore Nebraska's need
for labor-management relations legislation. Nebraska was a pioneer
in this field in 1920. The work of its Constitutional Convention in
proposing Article XV, Section 9, was a significant and constructive
accomplishment.
In the intervening years, our industry, economy, society, and
their related legal doctrines, have developed almost beyond recognition. In two critical respects insofar as labor-management relations
is concerned, the Constitution has not kept pace. In 1920, the concept of "business or vocation affected with a public interest" was
a rule used by courts to uphold legislative economic regulation.
Since then, the concept has been abandoned in its American spawning grounds, the federal courts, as being incorrect, unworkable and
essentially incapable of definition. Having been frozen into the
Nebraska Constitution, however, it has become a pillory which may
immobilize future legislative action.
To a considerable degree, the "business or vocation affected with
a public interest" requirement leaves the legislature in precisely
the same position it was in before 1920. It can select a single shot
weapon under the police powers, and possibly even divide the
labor-management relations field unnaturally into two or more
separate components and select two or more single shot weapons.
For the arsenal of high powered equipment containing flexible
powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, considered the most desirable means of approaching the problem in 1920, and still the most meaningful today, Article XV, Section 9, must be employed. But the "business or vocation affected
with a public interest" requirement in that section has nullified
its intended effectiveness in present day terms.
Similarly, voluntary arbitration agreements were once regarded
merely as devices to avoid the jurisdiction of the courts and were
invalidated on that basis. In the modern day economic picture,
voluntary arbitration agreements become a means of industrial
self-government under nearly all of the existing collective agreements, and exist for industrial purposes and concern subject matters
over which the courts might not, and should not, be empowered
or equipped to deal.
As a minimum, the Nebraska Constitution should be amended
in two ways. The language "in any business or vocation affected
with a public interest" should be deleted from Article XV, Section
9. Constitutional recognition should be given to legislative authority
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to regulate the legality and enforceability of voluntary labor arbitration agreements.
The other problems discussed in this article should be given
consideration as a part of the thorough and technical analysis of a
Constitutional Convention, if one is called, or of a constitutional
study committee. The main defects in our Constitution are the
matters of "business or vocation affected with a public interest" and
the unenforceability of voluntary arbitration agreements. The solution of these two matters would contribute much to the industrial
well-being of the state.

